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ABSTRACT 
IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN LONG TERM CARE 
AND ROGER’S DIFFUSION OF INNOVATION THEORY 
Elizabeth M. Shiels 
May 11, 2018     
Kentucky is one of the top ten states in the U.S. in the number of Presidential 
Declarations of Disaster (PDD) over the past ten years.   This is due to its geology and 
weather patterns.     The far western portion of Kentucky lies on the New Madrid Seismic 
Zone, one of the most dangerous fault lines in the United States; and natural hazards such 
as tornadoes, earthquakes, flash floods, severe storms offer only minutes or even seconds 
of advance notice. These “no-notice” emergencies with no timely warnings are the most 
common hazards experienced in Kentucky.    
In these events, individual long term care facilities and local/state responders rely 
even more so on good planning (Bolton & Zimmerman, 2007; Waxman et al., 2017). 
Emergency responses need to be based on sound plans that are pre-tested using exercises 
organized and facilitated by community partners that include first responders. The lessons 
learned by the research about solid decision-making for shelter-in-place or evacuation 
decisions are just as important in no-notice events as hurricane emergencies.   
In 2016, CMS announced a Final Rule for Emergency Preparedness for seventeen 
categories of health care providers, including long term care facilities, with a required 
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implementation date of November 2017. The components of the CMS Final Rule are 
comprehensive, wide-reaching and very new to many LTC facilities creating apprehension, 
confusion and a strain on management resources. 
The conceptual foundation/theory chosen to assess the process of diffusion, 
adoption and implementation of emergency preparedness of KY LTC is Everett Rogers’ 
Diffusion of Innovation Theory (Rogers,1995). A survey based on best practices for long 
term care preparedness was sent to ninety-one KY LTC that had attended training in 
emergency preparedness to identify the adoption and implementation levels of their 
preparedness and their readiness to reach compliance with the CMS Final Rule. Fifty 
completed responses were received and analyzed.  Results found that 70% of LTC had 
adopted comprehensive best practices and over 74% and 72% had participated in training 
and emergency exercises, respectively. A further 90% had established partnerships with 
their first responders and/or participated in their regional health care coalitions.  
Evacuation preparedness presents a gap in planning and requires ongoing support 
and emphasis. Diffusion of Innovation theory proved valuable in measuring the impact of 
relationships, communication and overall preparedness. The theory also identified the 
significance of change agents as key players in diffusion and adoption resulting in 
implementation. The most utilized change agents were the KY Emergency Preparedness 
for Aging & LTC Program, the two state long term care associations and the KY Office of 
Inspector General. Regional health care coalitions were found to be the major source of 
preparedness networking.
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Statement of the Problem 
“No-notice catastrophic disasters pose one of the greatest challenges to national 
emergency  preparedness, whether caused by manmade attacks or natural 
events…For example, federal emergency response planning estimates on  the 
consequences of a catastrophic earthquake along known fault lines in the central 
United  States include impacts to multiple states and more specifically project over 
75,000 casualties (injured and fatalities), more than 380,000 displaced from their 
homes  and  communities, at least 330,000 buildings moderately or severely 
damaged, and direct  economic losses surpassing  $200 billion”. (p.1, 
Government Accountability Office,  2014). 
Kentucky is one of the top ten states in the U.S. in the number of Presidential 
Declarations of Disaster (PDD) over the past ten years.   This is due to its geology and 
weather patterns.     The far western portion of Kentucky lies on the New Madrid Seismic 
Zone, one of the most dangerous fault lines in the United States; and natural hazards such 
as tornadoes, earthquakes, flash floods, severe storms offer only minutes or even seconds 
of advance notice. These “no-notice” emergencies with no timely warnings are the most 
common hazards experienced in Kentucky.   Since 2008, the risk to Kentucky 
experiencing one or more no-notice events has increased.  The combination of increased 
likelihood of incidence, severity, and disastrous impact on life and infrastructure place 
287 Kentucky long term care (LTC) facilities at critical risk for hazardous outcomes. 
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 The complexity of community response in a no-notice event involves multiple 
response agencies, jurisdictions, effective communication between responders and 
jurisdictional leadership and the community, transportation planning and resilience on the 
part of the affected populations (Waxman et al., 2017; Bolton & Zimmerman, 2007).   In 
order to increase the preparedness for a catastrophic earthquake originating from the New 
Madrid Seismic Zone, a potentially catastrophic no-notice disaster, Congress mandated a 
National Level Disaster Exercise be conducted in 2011 across the states most at-risk for 
severe damage. Eight at-risk states were identified: Missouri, Tennessee, Kentucky, 
Indiana, Illinois, Mississippi, Arkansas and Alabama. The epicenter of a 7.7 scale 
earthquake on the New Madrid fault would likely be Memphis, Tennessee. Each state 
developed their own exercise to respond to the degree of risk identified by the U.S. 
Geological Service (USGS, 2011).   USGS applied current technology to the original data 
based on damage experienced during the great New Madrid earthquake of 1811. 
Under these circumstances, Kentucky is estimated to experience catastrophic 
damage in the far western regions of the state with an estimated 300 fatalities and 7,000 
casualties. These estimates, however, do not include the approximate 4,400 licensed 
nursing facility beds, 2,400 personal care beds, and 4,000 persons daily receiving home 
health services who would be especially vulnerable to a catastrophic event. (USGS, 2011). 
 Damage to buildings, hospitals, schools and family dwellings would be 
severe with almost one-third of all structures in KY receiving moderate to severe damage. 
Structural damage to buildings would include severe impact to all hospitals in three western 
regions such that they would be inoperable. All nursing homes would be significantly 
impacted ranging from total destruction to loss of working utilities including phone, water, 
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heat and air conditioning. It is estimated that all residents living in the western regions of 
Kentucky (1-3) would have to evacuate under these catastrophic conditions. Those 
facilities in the least impacted region could experience sinkhole damage or, at a minimum,  
Figure 1 
not be able to operate without State and Federal assistance with needed resources for at 
least two weeks (USGS, 2011). The minimum level of impact could produce damage to 
infrastructure with loss of generator power due to lack of fuel supplies and travel bans due 
to poor road conditions.  
 All road and river transportation would be closed due to destruction and 
potential non-navigable river conditions. Air transport would be the only means of 
transport in or out of Region 1 (Jackson Purchase). Estimates of public and private access 
to helicopters suggests that even if all Department of Defense (DOD) helicopters were 
recalled from combat zones, there would not be an adequate supply to respond to the 
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evacuation need. The severity of impact to this region would be immediately devastating 
and would remain so for many years to come.  
The Pennyroyal region (Region 2) could experience significant power, water, 
telephone outages, sinkhole damage, and impassible road conditions. Recovery response 
could take up to two weeks for the region to be moderately functional. The Green River 
region (Region 3) would experience some liquefaction, mainly in cities and counties 
bordering the Ohio River.   Infrastructure could be severely damaged requiring some 
evacuations and at least a month long delay in its replacement.  Facilities with less 
significant damage could have water, power, sanitation and telephone access restored to a 
sufficient degree within that timeframe. Some areas of the region could provide support to 
those farther west and south. 
Needless to say, the impact on the LTC facilities in the three regions (20 counties) 
at the highest risk for no-notice events is a major concern to planners, policymakers and 
responders as would be their concern for the impact on hospitals and other critical 
infrastructure. An analysis of LTC average daily census in the three regions most at-risk 
indicates that if all LTC facilities in the three regions needed to evacuate, there would be a 
statewide shortage of 2281 licensed beds in LTC facilities available to receive evacuees 
(KY CHFS, 2013). 
States with frequent hurricanes know this planning very well and have 
transportation agreements in place, emergency supply storage, vendor agreements and 
alternate care sites pre-established with sufficient time to evacuate before the event.   
Kentucky, however, experiences disaster events with little-to-no advance notice. By the 
time the event occurs, transportation systems could be fully assigned elsewhere and road 
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access could be damaged and impassable. Selection of alternate care sites for evacuation 
in a catastrophic disaster in Kentucky would require the best-available option, that is a 
“stable” building in closest proximity to the damaged facility. LTC facilities would be on 
their own to transport residents, food, supplies, mattresses, medications, client records, 
assistive devices, and medical equipment literally down the street to a “stable” building 
until help could arrive within 72-96 hours.   LTC facilities located in rural areas have fewer 
options as proximity to alternative sheltering is significantly less than urban LTC sheltering 
locations and longer travel distances are involved. In that case, good relationships with 
neighbors with tractors, trucks and other vehicles would be the only option.  
HOLLYWOOD, Florida—After an estimated 215 people died in hospitals and 
 nursing homes in Louisiana following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, policy makers 
 realized that the nation’s health care institutions were ill-equipped for disasters. 
One of the rules they created after years of discussion looked especially prescient 
 in light of the tragic deaths on Wednesday of eight nursing home residents in 
 Florida’s post-hurricane heat. But the rule, powering supplies and temperature 
 control, will not be enforced until November….” (Neil Reisner and Sheri Fink, Sept. 
 14, 2017; The New York Times). 
 
Following the hurricane season of 2005, beginning in 2006, the Office of Inspector 
General, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) reported out the results of a 
study to assess nursing home performance during the hurricanes of 2004-2005. As a result, 
recommendations were issued for “guidelines” for comprehensive emergency 
preparedness for long term care facilities (CMS, 2006, 2013).   The guidelines, however, 
have been voluntary.   In 2016, CMS announced a Final Rule for Emergency Preparedness 
for seventeen categories of health care providers, including long term care facilities, with 
a required implementation date of November 2017.   The components of the CMS Final 
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Rule are comprehensive, wide-reaching and very new to many LTC facilities creating 
apprehension, confusion and a strain on management resources. 
Between the 2006 issuance of recommended guidelines and November 2017, the 
United States has experienced catastrophic hurricanes with Hurricane Irene in 2011, 
Hurricane Sandy in 2012, and Hurricanes Harvey and Irma in 2017. In the absence of 
comprehensive preparedness planning, evacuation decision-making and emergency 
response implementation, the same issues of vulnerability of long term care residents’ 
safety remain.     
An estimated 48 million or 14.9% of the U.S. population is 65 or older 
(Administration on Aging [AOA], 2016).  The Administration on Aging (AOA) estimates 
the majority of older persons have at least one chronic health condition with the average 
number increasing with age. The most common chronic conditions include hypertension 
(72%), arthritis (50%), heart disease (30%), cancer (24%), and diagnosed diabetes (20%). 
Approximately 35.9% of older persons report some type of disability, be it hearing, vision, 
cognition, or independent living difficulty (AOA, 2013). These functional limitations 
become severe and increase with age.  For instance, it has been reported that 83% of 
Medicare beneficiaries have difficulty with at least one or more activities of daily living 
(ADLs), such as bathing, ambulation, eating, dressing oneself, toileting and transferring.  
Sixty-seven percent had difficulty with three or more activities of daily living (AOA, 
2010).   
By the end of 2014, an estimated 1.4 million persons in the U.S. lived in long term 
care (LTC) facilities representing 2.6% of the over-65 and 9.5% of the 85+ year old 
population.   Almost half of nursing home residents need assistance with four out of five 
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ADLs (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid [CMS], 2009).  In 2014, approximately 61.4% 
of nursing home or LTC facility residents had moderate to severe cognitive impairment 
with 38.7% having severe impairment. An estimated 38.7% of residents had none to mild 
cognitive impairment with Kentucky numbers running less than the national average, 
suggesting well over 61% have some form of cognitive impairment (CMS, 2016). 
Given their advanced age, physical and cognitive difficulties, the elderly have little 
physical or emotional reserve remaining to cope with other stressors, particularly the stress 
of a natural disaster (Fernandez, 2002; Johnson et al., 2006; Mokdad et al., 2005).  Special 
needs are more likely to arise for the elderly during and after a natural disaster or terror 
attack. Cognitive impairment can be exacerbated. Evacuation can create disorientation, 
trauma response or potentially death and refusal to evacuate can put them at greater risk of 
disability, disease or death (Pekovic, Seff, & Rothman, 2008). Vulnerability of home-
dwelling elders increases in prolonged power outages as access to nutrition, power needs 
for medical equipment, and physical access to first responders is compromised.   Caregiver 
abandonment of the frail elderly have also occurred before they can be evacuated to a 
shelter (Silverman & Weston, 1995).  
Elders are at greater risk for illness and death due to exposure to the heat and the 
cold during and in the aftermath of a natural disaster.   For instance, during the Chicago 
Heat Wave of 1995, of the close to 700 deaths that occurred, the median age of the deceased 
was 75 (Semenza et al., 1996; Aldrich & Benson, 2008) and 72% of the heat-related deaths 
were persons 65 and older (Whitman et al., 1997).  Most recently, during Hurricane Irma 
in Florida in 2017, eight (8) residents of a nursing facility in Hollywood, Florida, died from 
heat exposure during a storm-related power outage.  
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Even prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, natural disasters during 
the 1990s (i.e. hurricanes, earthquakes, ice storms and prolonged power outages) had 
already highlighted the special vulnerabilities of older persons and the health care systems 
serving them. Vulnerabilities, especially for those living in LTC facilities, included ill-
equipped community shelters. The time required for evacuating elders to shelters was 
significantly longer than for non-frail persons; critical personal identification information 
often was lacking such as name, picture IDs, special needs identification, health conditions 
and medication requirements.  
The capacity to manage the needs of LTC facilities’ staff and the rest of the 
community was greatly stressed during Hurricane Andrew in 1992.   One 500-bed nursing 
facility swelled by an additional 500 family members of staff and community-dwelling 
frail elders needing shelter and medical assistance in the face of electrical and water outages 
(Silverman & Weston, 1995).  During the Northridge, California earthquake in 1994, not 
only did twenty-three long term care facilities sustain significant damage with five facilities 
finding it necessary to close, 52% of nursing facilities admitted evacuees from hospitals, 
other nursing facilities and community-dwellings housing elders (Saliba, Buchanan & 
Kington, 2004) swelling their populations in the midst of severe utility outages.  
The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center Towers created mass structural 
devastation to the buildings, to the neighborhoods surrounding the towers and placed a 
never-before experienced strain on first responders and their communication networks and 
infrastructure including land lines and cell phones, hospitals, and transportation resources.   
A review of the published literature on managing disasters and recovery efforts in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks underscored time and time again that the greatest gaps in the 
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response to the unprecedented tragedy occurred in communication between and among 
responders, among families and business that can be best stated as the inadequate capacity 
to respond, protect, and defend citizens and property on US soil (General Accounting 
Office, 2006). First responder agencies, such as fire departments, police, emergency 
medical services and private security personnel had no means of communication across 
agencies. Each agency operated its own communication network using its own frequencies 
and types of communication equipment so responders from different agencies had no way 
of knowing what was happening in overall incident response. This led to hundreds of deaths 
of responder personnel and created barriers to other response agencies to back-up and 
support first responders (GAO, 2006).   Communication was also severely hampered 
among family members trying to contact each other to make sure they were safe; employers 
were unable to contact employees to maintain company operations; and, healthcare 
personnel were unable to track patient activity or deceased patients. Telephone usage was 
so great coming in and going out of the New York area that the telecommunications 
networks did not function. Family members went for days and weeks without knowing if 
their loved ones were safe or in the hospital or possibly dead (GAO, 2006) 
Later it was found that isolated frail seniors living alone, possibly harmed from 
toxic exposure to the air and without food or necessary resources, were not identified for 
over a week because responders and providers did not know they were there. Another 
barrier was identification and assessment of the status of frail elders living in the area 
adjacent to the attack site because providers of care for elders were not permitted in the 
area of the attacks. Children in day care in the surrounding area, however, were identified 
within hours because there was a family member who knew where they were.   It only took 
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days for house pets to be checked and identified because owners knew where they were. 
The isolated frail seniors who did not have family waited for the system to get to them 
(O’Brien, 2003), indicative of how little emphasis had been given to elder safety and 
preparedness. 
What was most apparent from the terror attack was the nation was not prepared to 
respond in a coherent, collaborative, effective manner to a major disaster from an internal 
threat or an external threat with no advance notice. Lack of preparedness crossed all lines 
including the emergency response network, the healthcare system, public health as well as 
individuals, families and organizations.  
 Three parallel efforts related to strengthening the health care system response 
followed on the heels of the 9/11 attacks: 1) the vulnerability of special populations, 
particularly older persons,  2) changes in and funding to the national preparedness structure, 
and 3) more clarity for the role of the health care system. Homeland Security was mandated 
to establish an Emergency Response Plan. The Plan’s objectives were to combine a wide 
variety of Federal plans into one comprehensive plan to address the prevention, 
preparedness, response and recovery phases of emergency events incorporating all 
disciplines and addressing all-hazards ranging from natural disasters to manmade disasters 
(2002).  The Plan called for coordination of incidents that reach beyond local and State 
capabilities while integrating local and State jurisdictions in coordination, communication 
and incident management structures. While hospitals were accredited by The Joint 
Commission regarding emergency preparedness for many years, no such depth of 
requirements existed for long term care facilities at the Federal or State levels. 
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 At the state level, Kentucky’s Division of Emergency Management (KYEM) is the 
state equivalent of FEMA and is tasked with creating a statewide system of mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery. It includes development of an overall State 
Emergency Management (EM) Plan and management of the state Emergency Operations 
Center. Kentucky EM is prepared to respond to any event twenty-four hours a day, seven 
days a week. Its authority is derived from the Kentucky legislature (KRS 39) and the 
Federal National Response Framework. Kentucky Emergency Management (KYEM) 
appoints regional emergency managers across 14 regions in the state. Under Federal 
statute, each county and political jurisdiction must also have an emergency manager. These 
county emergency managers report to the local county judge or mayor. Kentucky has 120 
counties, each with a County Judge Executive.  There are 120 county emergency managers 
in the Commonwealth each with a different chain of command.  
Following hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Congress transferred preparedness funding 
to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Office of Assistant Secretary 
for Preparedness and Recovery (ASPR). Federal funding shifted away from bioterrorism 
and weapons of mass destruction to preparedness for any threat to a locale, a County, or 
region (all-hazards) whether it is a natural threat or manmade threat. The Kentucky 
Department of Public Health (KDPH) has responsibility for the same mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery coordination in matters regarding the public’s health. 
The KDPH preparedness branch coordinates and collaborates with KYEM and is an 
integral partner on most matters relating to Kentucky preparedness and response.  
KDPH also administers the Kentucky Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) on 
behalf of the Department of Health and Human Services ASPR funding. The HPP program 
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is organized into 13 HPP regions with regional health care coalitions. Hospital 
Preparedness regional health care coalitions meet monthly, bi-monthly or quarterly 
depending on the structure of each region to address hospital and other healthcare 
organizations all-hazards preparedness for and response to biological, environmental and 
weather-related disasters. These include tornados, floods, power outages, pandemic flu, 
chemical attack and/or spills and other national events that effect the operations of 
healthcare organizations and their patients, including hospitals and nursing facilities.  
HPP regional health care coalition members include regional and local emergency 
managers, hospital management, health planners, as well as representatives from mental 
health, long term care representatives, Emergency Medical Services, Veterans 
Administration, Fire Service, schools of public health and social work among others. The 
range of membership representation suggests the variety of response and planning agencies 
that work together on a regular basis to coordinate efforts and share learning.  Participating 
members are required to be knowledgeable about preparedness and be certified in the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS) Incident Command System (ICS). The 
HPP regional health care coalitions are organized by Area Development Districts and 
monthly or quarterly regional Coalition members meet to share their planning and lessons 
learned from regional events. 
The functions of the Kentucky HPP include: 
 A regular forum for the healthcare community and first responders at the county, 
regional and state level to promote emergency preparedness; 
 Coordinate and improve delivery of health care response in an emergency; 
 Foster communication among members at all levels on preparedness and response; 
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 Ensure community response readiness through training and exercises; 
 Promote preparedness in the healthcare community through standardized practices 
and integration with response partners.  
(www.louisvilleky.gov/Health/HERA.com) 
KDPH staff had been tasked with recruiting the long-term care providers to 
participate in the regional hospital preparedness coalitions since the original HRSA funding 
of 2002. The KDPH Preparedness Branch had attempted to work with long term care for 
two years with little success. KDPH set aside $100,000 of ASPR funds to create an 
incentive for long term care facilities specifically to participate in the regional HPP 
program for equipment and training purchases. KDPH had also purchased a national LTC 
training model for all Kentucky LTC facilities under the condition the facilities attend a 
train-the-trainer session and take the training back to their facilities/regions.  Neither of the 
efforts proved effective. Of the $100,000 made available to LTC, approximately $70,000 
went unspent. A number of facilities sent trainers and ultimately nothing happened beyond 
that. Facilities did not incorporate the national model nor train staff. Financial incentives 
did not work. 
In 2008, the KDPH Preparedness Branch asked the University of Kentucky and 
University of Louisville to shift focus from their effort of bioterrorism training of 
community-based agencies serving seniors to an HPP all-hazards’ preparedness approach 
for KY LTC facilities.  That effort provided training to community-based agencies serving 
seniors in bioterrorism, all-hazards and pandemic flu preparedness. The two universities 
had worked with all of the regional Area Agencies on Aging in the state and developed 
partnerships with public health emergency planners, trainers and coordinators across the 
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state as well as county emergency managers. The community-based aging agencies served 
by the universities had come a long way during that time to develop organizational plans 
and foster staff individual and family plans. Based on that success, KDPH asked the 
partnership to attempt to make headway with long term care. 
KDPH contracted with gerontology faculty from KY’s two largest universities to 
engage long term care and the Hospital Preparedness Program coalitions with the creation 
of the KY Emergency Preparedness for Aging & LTC Program (KYEPA). One of the 
initial objectives of the new program was to increase the number of KY LTC facilities’ 
involvement in their HPP regional health care preparedness coalitions, and second, to 
expand the capacity of Kentucky’s long term care facilities to respond to disasters by 
creating a statewide manual specifically for long term care and to train KY LTC facilities 
in the National Incident Management System Incident Command System (NIMS). Partners 
were added each year as products, tools and training were developed to meet the most 
recent needs. 
LTC facilities were highly resistant to anyone carrying the message, “I am from the 
state or HPP and I am here to help”.  After all, the LTC industry is so heavily regulated 
that facilities do not welcome any additional requirements and the state regulators report 
to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services regional offices. The last step for 
Kentucky preparedness with LTC was to go outside of the department to persons with 
knowledge of and relationships with the aging network. 
A string of years of very severe weather impacted the state (2008-2010), especially 
the western part of the state. Interest in attending trainings and coalition meetings increased 
as regions experienced storms. The KYEPA program provided training through the HPP 
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regional health care coalitions, state LTC associations, emergency management, state 
Department of Homeland Security, aging networks among others. Ease of access to 
training and coalition activities were supported by partner organizations, electronic media 
and live presentations. 
A handful of long term care administrators and staff had attended some HPP 
regional health care coalition meetings. These early adopters struggled to stay engaged 
because of the disparate cultures of organizations around the tables. Emergency 
management language was alienating, hierarchical and militaristic. Long term care was 
viewed as a source of surge capacity for hospitals with the hospitals offering nothing in 
return. In fact, in some HPP regional health care coalition meetings, hospital 
representatives actually told the group that “long term care should not be there because 
there were not enough resources to share with them and they never wanted to hear the 
phrase long term care again”. The special needs and vulnerabilities of the nursing facility 
population did not factor into the picture. This changed with the 2005 hurricane season. 
 The lack of CMS regulations was a barrier to adoption of emergency preparedness 
plans by LTC facilities.   Regulations were limited to very few elements and some lacked 
specificity. LTC State surveyors followed criteria for preparedness established under 
Sections 1819 and 1919 of the Social Security Act. These are identified in State surveyor 
requirements of: 
 F517   “The facility must have detailed written plans in emergency procedures to 
meet all potential emergencies and disasters, such as fire, severe weather and 
missing residents…” 
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 F518   “The facilities must train all employees in emergency procedures with 
existing staff, and carry out unannounced staff drills using those procedures”  
(DHHS, 2006). 
 The unannounced drills typically are applied to the mandatory fire drills required 
four times a year.   Facilities are also required to have a backup generator with the ability 
to power emergency lighting and power outlets for life-sustaining equipment.   Additional 
requirements include emergency supplies of food and water supplies, up to 2-3 days, and 
to identify an alternate care site in the event of an evacuation. 
 Coastal states, especially Florida and Texas, have legislated best practices well 
beyond the CMS regulations.   Kentucky’s emergency plan had only 8 out of the 22 (36%) 
requirements in place (see Table 1).     
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Table 1: Kentucky and Gulf State Requirements for Nursing Home 
Emergency Plans 
State Requirements  KY AL* FL LA MS TX 
Community coordination  
  
X X X X 










Direction and control  
  
X X X X 










Emergency food, water, supplies  X 
 
X X X X 










Evacuation procedures  X 
 
X X X X 







X X X X 
Host facility agreement  
  
X X X X 











Document training and drills  X 
 
X X X X 













Individual identification of residents  
  
X 
   
Designated area for supply storage  
   
X 
  
*Alabama relies on Federal 
requirements. 
 
      
Source: Office of Inspector General analysis of State administrative code and 




A 2006 study, funded by the Federal Office of the Inspector General following 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, changed the awareness of LTC preparedness planning. It 
found that 94% of LTC facilities in their survey did indeed have emergency plans and 80% 
had completed staff training in emergency planning, meeting the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services’ (CMS) requirements at the time.   However, the content of the plans 
was found to be lacking in specificity as there were no precise CMS guidelines met or 
followed as to what comprises an emergency plan. Further, the study found that in the face 
of an emergency, administrators did not follow their plans, contributing to unsafe 
conditions and increased potential for death and injury (DHHS, 2006).    Recommendations 
from this original 2006 study were summarized into two categories: 1) CMS should provide 
more specific requirements for emergency plans and, 2) CMS make clear its support for 
communication between LTC facilities and emergency responders.   Based on these 
recommendations, CMS issued a 25-item recommended checklist for LTC plans. 
A 2012 Office of Inspector General follow-up report of national compliance for 
emergency preparedness regulations from 2007-2010 found that compliance with these 
same regulations had decreased to 92% and 72%, respectively. In the meantime, CMS had 
issued recommended checklists to LTC, State survey agencies and LTC Ombudsman 
providing greater specificity and detail as to tasks to be incorporated in comprehensive 
emergency plans.   
There are stark examples of the risks to nursing home facilities or LTC in disasters 
whether they be related to hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, or flooding. And yet, even 
after catastrophic disasters that clearly put LTC residents in danger, long term care facilities 
have been reluctant to implement comprehensive disaster planning. In an environment 
18
where CMS, the chief regulatory agency for LTC, only provided “recommendations” about 
preparedness compared to literally thousands of regulations for LTC in general, are there 
effective ways to engage LTC or LTC to improve voluntary preparedness?  
Purpose of study 
Although studies of LTC preparedness planning have been published in response 
to hurricanes in particular, the research studies investigating the degree of preparedness 
planning among LTC in no-notice disaster states are virtually non-existent.  Previous LTC 
studies have focused on responses to catastrophic disasters such as hurricanes identifying 
steps in planning and mitigation that might have lessened the loss of life, damage to facility 
infrastructure and vulnerability of the population. The research has significantly 
contributed to the knowledge base of effective LTC preparedness and provides 
recommendations specific to anticipated, frequent disasters where pre-storm response to 
impending storms can be implemented days in advance enhancing safety and quality of 
life. This is not the case with no-notice events. 
The purpose of this study is to add to this research and has two specific aims.  The 
first is to conduct an analysis of the status of LTC preparedness in a no-notice state, 
highlighting state efforts to strengthen LTC preparedness and illuminate the gaps in 
preparation related to its voluntary nature in years prior to the CMS Final Rule. The study 
will assess Kentucky long term care emergency preparedness based on a survey 
administered to one-third of LTC facilities in 2014, particularly facilities that have been 
exposed to planning and training events for emergency preparedness. The second is to 
apply aspects of Diffusion of Innovation Theory (Rogers, 2003) to examine the diffusion, 
adoption and implementation of emergency planning practices both mandated and 
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voluntary for LTC facilities, especially in light of the promulgation of comprehensive new 
regulations. The two foci identify the status of one-third of Kentucky LTC facilities in 
regards to their preparedness for a no-notice event and identify the use of private and public 
supports that contributed to LTC facilities readiness for emergencies and the new 
regulations.  
Importance of the Study to Social Work 
 This study is important to social work for several reasons. It amplifies the role social 
work can play in the diffusion of new ideas. Historically, public health as a discipline has 
been the “natural” partner in training, managing exercise, motivating health care providers 
to make voluntary prevention changes and collaborating with emergency management. 
Social work brings a perspective of the person-in-environment and a tradition of 
relationship-building, especially in the field of aging, that also makes it a “natural” partner 
as well. Social workers serve in front line positions in LTC and can relate to the impact of 
regulations and resident-related issues that arise every day in a practice setting. 
  Leadership in health care advocacy, aging collaborations and the strength of its 
networks placed the opportunity for the Kentucky program to succeed.   Relationships with 
state LTC associations contributed to the dissemination of new information and access to 
training settings never before available. The pathways identified with the spread of 
knowledge about innovation outside of the typical populations in social work serve to 







As far back as Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the gaps in understanding needs of frail 
elders during disasters living in long term care were recognized (Silverman & Weston, 
1995) and identified the biggest gaps as evacuation planning, communications, staffing and 
patient care.   Frail elders were identified as extremely vulnerable in disasters following 
9/11 (Johnson et al., 2006).  The largest body of research on nursing home emergency 
preparedness has come out of the 2005 hurricane season that included Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita.  And, the greatest area of focus has been evacuation planning, transportation 
issues, evacuation decision-making, evacuation outcomes among the lessons learned 
related to evacuation (Dosa et al., 2007; Hyer, et al., 2012). This is understandable as the 
research has looked at catastrophic events in coastal areas where evacuation is the best 
option for the community including long term care facilities. The most frequent type of 
event fitting those characteristics are hurricanes. 
       A unique characteristic of hurricanes compared to other catastrophic events is that 
there is often advance notice of 3-5 days that the storm is coming and the potential scope 
of impact as in Hurricanes Katrina, Sandy, Harvey and Irma. This enables long term care 
administrators, emergency managers and first responders to evacuate facilities well in 
advance of the event. Transportation is problematic for LTC facilities as the logistics of 
evacuation in a catastrophic event are very complex. Determining evacuation zones and  
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their timing is challenging, evacuation too early can place residents at unnecessary risk 
(Dosa et al., 2007).  If an entire neighborhood or community have to evacuate and all of 
the transportation resources are needed at the same time, it may be difficult to establish 
priority populations for limited transportation resources (Chiu & Zheng, 2007).   Lack of 
coordination between local, state and national transportation resources may create delays 
in response (Chiu & Zheng, 2007). This also applies to coordination and collaboration with 
county emergency management.  
There has also been a lack of clarity in the effective decision-making process to 
evacuate. How are risks weighed to evacuate or shelter-in-place?   Sheltering in-place is 
the preferred option. Staff are already on-site, there may be space to shelter their families 
to ensure their availability and residents face fewer negative outcomes in a shelter-in-place 
situation. Sufficient provisions of water, food, medications are critical in sheltering-in-
place as is adequate power supply. During a major disaster LTC facilities’ fuel supplies 
may run out after 2-4 days. Transportation of backup fuel supplies may be hampered by 
routes being clogged or debris in the roads impeding transport. The same is true as to 
assignment of evacuees to sheltering in other long term care facilities or shelter space. 
 When a health care facility reaches maximum capacity to respond in an emergency 
and needs to send or “surge” patients to alternate sites during emergencies because 
incoming casualties placed pressure on the hospital’s capacity to absorb them while serving 
existing patients (Hick et al., 2014), demands for bed space become overwhelming to the 
point that hospitals may discharge less acute patients to other hospitals or even nursing 
homes. In even the most common emergency situation for LTC, evacuation due to a fire, 
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receiving LTC facilities are limited by regulation to accept only as many evacuees from 
hospitals or other LTC as they have licensed beds available. In sum, the logistics of 
emergency response is only as effective as the degree of planning. The unanticipated 
variables are so varied that all the best planning can be for naught in a major event; 
however, in the absence of planning, the event will manage the response versus the facility 
response managing the event.   
A major gap in the long-term care emergency preparedness literature relates to the 
experience of no-notice emergencies compared to advance notice events and voluntary 
adoption of comprehensive preparedness. The hurricane states have regulations that cover 
pre-incident response with 3-5 days advance notice during which target zones plan 
evacuation routes, mandatory evacuation and statewide sheltering, the coordination and 
assignment of buses, vans, ambulances, and other transportation resources.   
Kentucky is not a coastal state and is in a “no-notice” zone where events occur, 
especially catastrophic events, without advance notice. In these events, individual long 
term care facilities and local/state responders rely even more so on good planning 
(Waxman et al., 2017; Bolton & Zimmerman, 2007). Emergency responses need to be 
based on sound plans that are pre-tested using exercises organized and facilitated by 
community partners that include first responders. The lessons learned by the research about 
solid decision-making to shelter-in-place or evacuate are just as important to no-notice 
events. These include having transportation agreements within the impact area and outside 
of 50 miles as well as similar agreements with other long term care facilities to receive 
evacuees, again in close proximity and beyond 50 miles.  
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In most cases, long term care facility emergencies are specific to a single facility, 
not a community event. In the event of a community event, prolonged shelter-in-place is 
more likely than immediate evacuation as the resources for available beds and 
transportation may not be available. Again, this is especially true in a no-notice event. 
Therefore, the ability to shelter-in-place with sufficient water, food, medication and 
supplies and fuel for the backup generator become critical.  
CMS had not been willing to commit comprehensive preparedness to regulation 
until 2016-2017. Up to that time, state regulations and voluntary adoption and 
implementation of emergency preparedness have had to fill the many voids. Support for 
emergency preparedness for LTC has been driven by the DHHS Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) through the Hospital Preparedness 
Program.  
One of the success stories from the 2005 hurricane season in Florida was the 
development of collaboration between the two state LTC associations and the state survey 
agency.  A similar process was developed in Kentucky by the KYEPA program. The goals 
included creating a common state manual for LTC preparedness, engaging LTC in 
preparedness planning and participation in HPP regional health care coalitions. The 
Kentucky approach engaged LTC and health care policy stakeholders, change agents, LTC 
champions, regulators and HPP regional health care coalitions as well as state LTC 
associations. These disparate and often conflictual entities posed challenges and provided 
opportunities for collaboration.  
 Program activities included: 
 Development of the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual 
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 Partnering with HPP regional health care coalitions to sponsor program 
training to LTC 
 Partnering with the two state LTC associations to sponsor annual training 
at association conferences 
 Creating opportunities for LTC facility leadership to serve  on panels during 
program trainings to share their experiences with other LTC about recent 
emergencies  
 Providing training to state and regional first responder organizations about 
LTC preparedness 
 Working with the State Survey Agency (KY OIG) to create preparedness 
resources that integrate current regulations with evacuation planning and 
receiving evacuees during an emergency 
 Partnering with the KY OIG to provide preparedness training to state LTC 
and state survey staff 
 Program integration with all HPP regional health care organizations 
  Development of emergency exercise scenarios for LTC tabletop exercises 
and HPP regional health care coalition community exercises 
  Providing 24/7 situational awareness for the state health operations center 
during emergencies involving LTC 
 Participation in state-level policy committees focused on emergency 




Conceptual foundation/theory  
 The conceptual foundation/theory chosen to assess the process of diffusion, 
adoption and implementation of emergency preparedness of KY LTC is Everett Rogers’ 
Diffusion of Innovation Theory (Rogers,1995). Diffusion of Innovation (DOI) research 
has been applied widely to many different fields of innovation. A meta-analysis 
undertaken by Greenlaugh et al. (2004) found thirteen  different disciplines with a 
research tradition of diffusion and adoption literature. In addition, research also included  
adoption of technological innovations and health care (Peeters, JE de Veer, van der Hoek, 
& Francke, 2012),   farming (McGrath, & Zell, 2001), banking (Gopallakkrishnan, 
Wischnevsky, & Damanpour, 2003), intervention research in third world countries ( 
Pandey & Yadama, 1992), public health ( Katz, 1963; Haider & Kreps, 2004), health 
promotion (Ferrence, 2001), drug prevention (Pankratz, Hallfors, & Cho, 2002), and 
counseling (Murray, 2009) among many others. Its application to LTC emergency 
preparedness provides constructs with which to assess elements of diffusion of LTC 
preparedness as an innovation, adoption of core preparedness elements mandated by 
CMS prior to 2016 and the implementation of voluntary comprehensive preparedness 
across KY LTC.   Diffusion theory has been selected to also identify and explain 
pathways of communication that have been effective for KY LTC in learning about the 
innovation, hearing from peers as to its usefulness in emergencies, becoming familiar 
with resources that represent best practices, connecting with established HPP regional 
health care coalitions of response partners, and ways to test facility plans for continuous 
improvement.   
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Diffusion of Innovation Theory  
Diffusion of innovation theory (DOI) was developed by Everett Rogers in 1962. It 
was first applied in agricultural research and hybrid seed corn use; and today is one of the 
most widely applied theories across a wide range of fields of study such as agriculture, 
anthropology, technology, medicine and healthcare, public health, community 
development, marketing and management (Rogers, 2003). Its roots derive from Gabriel 
Tarde, one of the fathers of sociology and social psychology who studied attributes that 
influence adoption of new ideas and explained the ones that were successful and 
unsuccessful.    
 Diffusion of innovation theory is applicable to understanding the processes of the 
passive spread (diffusion) of an innovation, adoption or acceptance of an innovation which 
is defined here as a new idea, process, technology or application and the implementation 
of actual practices in an organization which produces a change to the culture of the 
organization.   It helps to explain a new idea as it is being applied.   It can also be used to 
bring greater awareness to the communication mechanism between and among the parties 
involved in the process.  
Most innovations, especially prevention focused changes (Rogers, 2003, p.234), 
take substantial time to diffuse sufficiently across a social system in order to create social 
change. Some innovations take less time as they create new programs, products and 
processes heretofore not used. Prevention-focused changes take more time because 
adopters are changing existing systems that have been in place for long periods of time. 
The time factor in the rate of diffusion can delay or impede its adoption. 
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   A final critical element in diffusion of innovation theory is the social system itself 
that is experiencing the adoption process. The size, structure, scale and nature of the social 
system can encourage or impede adoption of the innovation as “users may not be the 
choosers” (Dearing, 2009). In long term care, the adopters would likely be administrators, 
leaders with the influence to direct facility resources and staff in this new direction. In 
many cases, the person delegated with the responsibility to implement comprehensive 
preparedness serves in another role in the facility such as the director of nursing, facilities 
manager, activities director, etc. 
 This study will assess communication strategies facilities utilized for education, 
training, and use of preparedness skills. It will also assess degree of adoption of and 
compliance with mandated requirements from the state and CMS and, finally, assess degree 
of implementation of the voluntary elements of comprehensive planning derived from 
lessons learned and best practices of other state plans.  
Attributes associated with innovation adoption  
Rogers found that five perceived attributes of innovations account for 49-87% of 
the variance in the rate of adoption: relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, 
trialability and observability (Rogers, 1995).   Relative advantage suggests that the 
innovation needs to be clearly better than the process or product it replaces. Its application 
to organizational analysis of adoption has been reported by Pankratz, Hallfors and Cho 
(2002) as the primary attribute distinguishing organizational decision-making to adopt or 
not. An example from Long Term Care (LTC) is clearly illustrative of this key attribute.  
The previous minimal standards of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
were replaced by the new recommended CMS “guidelines for long term care emergency 
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preparedness” and coincided with the development of the KY All Hazards LTC Planning 
and Resource Manual. The advantage of the manual over current CMS requirements is that 
it incorporates the best practices from twenty other state plans, LTC facility plans and trade 
association recommendations and expands on the CMS guidelines to provide a complete 
emergency planning tool for long term care to adopt and implement.  Facilities that 
implement the manual will meet and exceed CMS recommended standards in a user-
friendly, comprehensive format by using the “crosswalk” incorporated in the KY All 
Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual   that identifies the CMS recommended 
guidelines matched to exact pages in the manual. Relative advantage provides a tangible 
benefit that may be quantified, in this case by monies saved by effective mitigation and 
preparedness.  
 Compatibility refers to the degree to which the innovation is compatible with 
potential adopters’ experiences, values and needs. And, is it better than the preparedness 
long term care used before the innovation of comprehensive planning. (Rogers, 2003; 
Greenhalph et al, 2004).  Pandey and Yadama’s study of adoption of improved cookstoves 
in Nepal (1992) found knowledge about the cookstoves had modest effect compared to the 
compatibility with cultural practices.   
Referring to the above LTC example, the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and 
Resource Manual  was specifically designed in collaboration with input from LTC facility 
leadership from the two KY state LTC associations. It incorporated their needs and 
experiences and is compatible with the values of long term care as opposed to 
overemphasizing the values of the incident response network or the militaristic tone so 
common to FEMA materials. Initial emergency preparedness manual development was 
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drawn from review of over 20 different state, local and agency plans related to long term 
care. The best ideas were applied from each plan to reflect the best practices in the field to-
date. The KY state long term care associations’ input added subjective content that 
enhanced the manual’s application to the culture and needs of Kentucky long term care 
facilities. 
 The complexity factor speaks to the ease of use of the innovation.  As applied here 
to long term care, the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual was written 
using language that is meaningful to long term care providers and services.  It bridges the 
requirements of the FEMA standards derived from the experience of firefighters and the 
military to easy and ready application by long term care.  
Trialability relates to the degree to which potential adopters can experiment with 
and even revise the product or process to meet their unique needs. The KY All Hazards 
LTC Planning and Resource Manual can be used in chapters or sections and is in electronic 
format so facilities can use any or all of the content to adopt or integrate with an existing 
plan. An electronic version of the entire manual in available on the KYEPA website and a 
CD was available in the back of the manual so facilities could make use of any or all of the 
material. 
 Observability refers to the tangible and physical evidence of the innovation in use 
and its impact.  In the case of the KY LTC, it is best illustrated by observations made during 
the early training process.   It was apparent in training events that include panels of LTC 
facility users that non-users responded best to first-hand reports of the benefits of the 
innovation from their peers increasing the likelihood they would adopt the innovation. 
Active facility users of the manual were incorporated in all of the training events.   They 
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sat on panels and shared their experience with adoption of the KY All Hazards LTC 
Planning and Resource Manual and gave first-hand experience as to how it assisted in their 
facility response and recovery in current disasters. These panels of peers provided the 
opportunity to observe (observability) how actual adoption and implementation of 
comprehensive emergency preparedness can benefit a long term care facility. In the end, 
they proved to be the single most persuasive element in increasing the diffusion of 
innovation process. In addition, when LTC facilities participated in on-site or regional 
disaster exercises, they could observe other LTC and first responders in application of the 
same principles/practices. 
Factors influencing Diffusion of Innovation 
Time is a critical factor in the diffusion of innovations. The diffusion process is 
cumulative over time and the decision process within the organization or adoption unit also 
varies in time. The degree of knowledge and persuasion preceding the adoption decision 
takes time.  Time can also frustrate diffusion of innovations.   In KY, LTC had 
opportunities for frequent repetition of the emergency preparedness process through 
multiple training offerings each year. Facilities could “try on” the minimal actions required 
by regulation or statute until they voluntarily put a comprehensive infrastructure in place. 
In theory, different actors in the communication process need time to integrate the 
information about the innovation and to communicate their attitudes about it to others or 
receive opinions from others. The rate of adoption is measured in time as the organization 
adopts, revises and maintains the innovation. Rogers found the distribution of adopters is 
cumulative over time and will rise in an S-shape curve. Innovators and early adopters are 
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few and the early majority and late majority adopters make up the bulk of the increase with 
a slight plateau for laggards (Rogers, 2003). 
 Communication channels are critical to the innovation diffusion process. The 
nature of the communication between two persons about the ease of use and utility of the 
innovation can determine whether it gets adopted or rejected as well as the rate of adoption. 
The research on diffusion of innovation has found that the decision to adopt is less about 
the actual qualities of the product/process and more about subjective assessment by peers 
and champions of the innovation. The degree of interpersonal communication that occurs 
about the innovation and the types of communication used by change agents can impact 
the rate of adoption. Change agents are invested in bringing the innovation to the potential 
users. In Kentucky, the KYEPA program has been a change agent, supported by the KY 
Department for Public Health and the KY State Survey Agency. Feedback from attendees 
of the training workshops reported that attending training with other long term care staff 
(especially safety committee staff) made a difference in their degree of enthusiasm to take 
the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual back to the facility and begin 
using it in their safety committees and management team. The same process was used with 
the development of a KY Incident Command System (ICS) training curricula for long term 
care so facilities could become certified in ICS levels 100, 200, 700 and 800. Facilities that 
attend group training were apt to integrate ICS into their preparedness planning. The 
materials were also incorporated into the KY bi-annual Emergency Preparedness for Aging 
electronic newsletters as well as in newsletters published by the two state long term care 
associations and the KY Office of Inspector General. It is difficult for a LTC facility in 
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Kentucky to not be exposed to the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual 
and the ICS information by peers and the key organizations that influence their work. 
 The characteristics of the social system and its norms are important variables in the 
rate of innovation adoption. The rate may differ based on differences in the size or location 
and norms of potential adopter (Rogers, 2003).  Norms may differ between urban long term 
care facilities and rural facilities because urban facilities have access to more resources and 
expect a ready response. They can be less inclined to collaborate with the HPP regional 
health care coalitions. Rural facilities depend on the cooperation of others in the 
community as a cultural norm and be more inclined to participate in HPP regional health 
care coalitions or be more self-sufficient and less inclined.  Prior to the KYEPA program, 
inaction was the norm across long term care facilities’ preparedness in Kentucky.  
 Real change occurs in the social system when ownership of the innovation shifts 
from change agent to opinion leaders, i.e. long term care stakeholders and facility 
administrators and staff who champion the benefits of adoption to others in the social 
system. The dominant change agent is and will continue to be CMS. As their expectations 
in the form of regulation has been limited, so has adoption.  
Opinion leaders within the social system can have significant influences on the rate 
of adoption because they tend to operate within the adopting organization and can influence 
decisions due to shared compatibility with organizational norms (Rogers, 2003).   In the 
case of Kentucky long term care, opinion leaders also include the KY state LTC 
associations as they have a major role in the establishment of norms. The degree of 
interconnectedness among members of these state associations is very high in Kentucky 
and their influence cannot be understated. If they incorporate emergency preparedness in 
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conference session topics or provide emphasis by sponsoring specific training, diffusion of 
the usefulness of preparedness leads to adoption which can lead to implementation.  
Types of Innovation Decisions 
 There are three types of innovation decisions: optional, collective and authority-
based decisions. Optional decisions are made by an individual independently of the rest of 
the organization.  In Kentucky’s case, for instance, there were three long term care facility 
administrators and one director of nursing, two in the eastern half of the state and two in 
the western half, who saw the value of emergency preparedness and how their facility could 
benefit from participating on the HPP regional health care coalitions. These champions got 
involved in the early days of their coalitions and became leaders in their regions and their 
state LTC associations. Their decisions to adopt were made as individuals, not because of 
promotion from a state association or emergency response agency. They were able to take 
advantage of grant monies early for their facilities and, therefore, be better prepared. 
 Collective decisions to adopt are based on a consensus decision-making. In some 
Kentucky facilities, for example, the consensus was that preparedness beyond minimum 
requirements of quarterly fire drills was unnecessary because they would simply take the 
residents to the local hospital. Those facilities have learned some hard lessons as they 
discovered that the hospitals planned to discharge patients to LTC during an emergency 
and, in some cases, refused to receive LTC residents during a life-threatening event. It 
became clear that if LTC needed to evacuate to other health care locations, relationships 
needed to be established, mutual aid agreements and memoranda of agreements needed to 
be developed to integrate LTC needs and resources into the health care provider/responder 
mix. 
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 Authority-based decisions to adopt or reject are decisions made by a few individuals 
in an organization based on their position of power or status.  Authority figures do not 
always view the investment of time and effort of value relative to the effort. And, 
emergency preparedness takes effort. In some cases, administrators did embrace the 
importance of preparedness and maintained leadership. In other cases, the job was 
delegated to environment/maintenance/facility managers. In others, it was delegated to 
nursing, dietary, or social services for example.  
Stages of the Innovation-Decision Process   
 Stages of innovation decisions are ultimately about individual and organizational 
behavior change. Rogers (2003) asserts that an individual moving from a change in 
knowledge about an idea to behavior change is a cumulative process. Different 
communication channels impact the rate of change to differing degrees. Knowledge change 
is easier to achieve than behavior change.  
For Rogers, the knowledge stage involves the potential user gaining knowledge of 
the innovation and how it functions. This stage can be impacted by the characteristics of 
the organization and the decision-maker, such as education, socioeconomic status, 
openness to new ideas, engagement with other like persons both inside and outside the 
organization.  Next, the individual moves through the persuasion stage as they hear about 
the new idea, product/process or behavior from others and develop a positive attitude 
stance towards using it. This is the stage where the social system acceptance or rejection 
of the innovation frames the individual moving to the decision stage or not. In the decision 
stage, the potential adopter intends to explore additional information about the innovation 
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and sets the intention to actually put the behavior in place, or “adopt” the behavior. The 
decision to accept the innovation or reject it is a product of the decision stage.  
The implementation stage occurs when the innovation is actually adopted and put 
into place followed by a period of “creating fit” through integrating new learning as the 
adopter organization uses the innovation. The confirmation stage occurs when the user 
experiences tangible benefit from using the innovation and it becomes integrated into the 
organization’s ongoing work. Use of the innovation is absorbed and maintained by the 
organization and it no longer feels like a new idea. Change is institutionalized. 
Interpersonal communication to others outside of the organization occurs and the 
innovation is diffused to other organizations. 
Characteristics of Adopters  
Rogers devised his categorization of adopter categories when he was a doctoral 
student at Iowa State in 1958. His criteria are premised on innovativeness, the “degree to 
which an individual or other unit of adoption is relatively earlier in adopting new ideas than 
other members of a social system” (Rogers, 2000). His research found a normal distribution 
curve supported categorization into five categories: innovators (2.5%), early adopters 
(13.5%), early majority (34%), late majority (34%) and laggards (16%) (Rogers, 2003). 
 Innovators are the most willing to be exposed and they can be viewed as outliers 
within their social system. Innovators can deal comfortably with the uncertainty of new 
ideas and how their use in the system may or may not be accepted. They bring the new idea 
to the organization, are open to their failure and still are willing to continue to bring other 
new ideas. 
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Early adopters are less the outlier and more the voice within the organization/social 
system that others look to for use of existing methods and new ways of doing things. Early 
adopters may be the opinion leaders and are sought out for input about the innovation. They 
may be more interconnected within the organization across management and line staff as 
well as outside of the organization with state associations (i.e.  state associations of nursing 
or long term care). This category of adopter is thought to be better-educated, more 
cosmopolitan and even considered to be a community leader (Rogers, 2003). 
The early majority may not have status within the organization; however, they hold 
a key role in moving the innovation further towards its use. They tend to follow the early 
adopters and become positive about the merits of the innovation. They are a linchpin in the 
interpersonal communication process about the innovation.   
The late majority maintain system norms. Hence, they are not risk takers and are 
skeptical of change. Their skepticism needs to be addressed to minimize the risk of them 
expending energy sharing a negative opinion of the innovation.    However, they are more 
willing to adopt an innovation if the evidence is convincing that the innovation has value.    
The laggards are last to adopt an innovation. Their process for innovation adoption 
is very lengthy due to their resistance to new ideas (Rogers, 2003). 
Diffusion of Innovation theory has been criticized for its “pro-innovation bias”  due 
to the claims that research often is funded by change agents with a vested interest in the 
research outcomes, the retrospective nature of the research, the research evaluates only 
innovations that have been successfully adopted and/or the research has only focused 
primarily on innovations that spread rapidly. This study is retrospective, does not evaluate 
the success of the adoption rather assesses useful pathways to adoption and implementation 
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and, in the years between the innovation and the CMS Final Rule, spread of the innovation 
has required consistency of diffusion over ten years given the complexity of preparedness 
planning and the frequency of LTC staff turnover (Laditka et al, 2006).  
Research on application of DOI theory as stated earlier crosses many disciplines. 
In a study of adoption of solar water heaters in China (Sereenonchai, Arunrat, Xu , & Yu, 
2017)  found that the most influential drivers for adoption were social influence, physical 
need, innovation attributes, income, communication channels, size, awareness, government 
policy and education in that order. 
Dearing, Beacom et al., (2017) undertook a study of Canadian long term care 
organizations’ diffusion and adoption of resident care best practices. They identified those 
sources of advice-giving organizations, groups or individuals most utilized in decisions to 
adopt new practices. Results identified that inter-organizational relationships had greater 
impact than interpersonal relationships and in many cases the health authorities or subject 
matter experts were more influential than expected. Proximity to the opinion leaders 
(individuals and organizations) was more important than cross-provincial or national 
networks. Social modeling from peers or organizations proved a powerful influence as 
well. 
The impact of manipulated versus voluntary adoption has been addressed by 
Gayadeen and Phillips (2014) in their work on diffusion of community policing 
incentivized by federal grants. Results found that diffusion and adoption can be hastened 
with financial incentives and political incentives. Initially, KY LTC did not respond to 
financial incentives. Awareness of the impact of comprehensive change of CMS and state 
regulations in the follow-up studies, may provide diffusion pathways to all category of 
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adopters for future adoption lessening the impact of time. The remaining question is how 





Purpose of study 
 The purpose of this research was twofold.  The first was a description of the status 
of long term care emergency preparedness based on survey responses from long term care 
facilities by analyzing their emergency preparedness plans; emergency training received 
by staff; emergency training exercises undertaken in their facility and HPP health care 
coalition region; resources outside their facilities they have utilized, and their needs for 
additional training.   The description was also to provide information on how diffusion of 
the innovation occurred-- through preferred training sponsors/providers and identification 
of how LTC facilities heard about the best practices as well as suggestions on the different 
communication pathways LTC facilities have used to gain information and knowledge 
about the innovation. 
The second purpose was to identify factors related to the adoption of emergency 
planning practices recommended or required for long term care facilities. Specifically, the 
focus was to assess implementation of the innovation by tracking the voluntary 
implementation of preparedness measures which exceeded existing regulations at the time 
of the study.  The factors that are suggested are from a widely used analytical model 
developed by Everett Rogers and described in his book “Diffusion of Innovations” (Rogers, 
2003).   His work has been widely used to analyze factors that influence adoption of 
farming practices, medications, new technology, banking practices, and public health 
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among others.   In this study, the analysis included: characteristics of long term care 
facilities, chief administrators; range of staff with significant knowledge of emergency 
planning, relationships with HPP regional health care coalitions, sources of additional 
training, participation in local, regional and state emergency exercises; and use of resources 
outside the facility.  
 The research questions explored in this study were: 
1. What is the profile of Long Term Care (LTC) facilities participating in 
emergency preparedness planning? 
2. What is the profile of representatives/leadership of LTC facilities 
participating in emergency preparedness planning? 
3. In LTC facilities’ emergency preparedness plans, what are the current 
planning elements?   
4. Are LTC facilities aware of a) recommended best practices and 
guidelines and b) what methods of communication and sponsors of 
training did they use?  
5. Are LTC facilities a) utilizing any of the recommended best practices and 
b) CMS guidelines for their emergency preparedness plan and, c) what 
specific potential emergencies and disasters are addressed?   
6. Are LTC facilities discussing emergency preparedness planning and 
coordination with other community organizations?  
7. How prepared operationally are LTC facilities to manage a no-notice 
emergency or disaster? 
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8. How prepared are LTC facilities to manage:  a) a no-notice evacuation of 
residents from their facility in case of an emergency or disaster? , and b) 
to host evacuees from another institution/health care facility? 
9. What experience do LTC facilities have with emergency preparedness 
training and drills/exercises? 
10. Are there any regional/geographic, facility size differences in regards 
 to emergency preparedness plans? (i.e. elements of plan, specific 
potential emergencies and disasters addressed,  awareness and 
utilization  of recommended best practices and guidelines, 
engaging  community organizations, facility operations, evacuations, 
and experiences with training, drills/exercises). 
11. Are there any regional/geographic, facility size differences in  
emergency preparedness planning in regard to Rogers’ Diffusion 
Innovation Theory related to adoption and implementation? 
12. What is the overall readiness of KY LTC for a no-notice 
emergency event? 
Study variables and measures  
 The study dealt with Kentucky’s long-term care system, particularly facility 
personnel who are involved in planning and training facility staff for serious emergency 
events. The study attempted to identify the range of personnel who are key participants in 
these activities and depth of their participation. It is generally believed that the more types 
of staff roles involved in preparedness leadership and the greater their exposure to training 
and emergency exercises, the better the plan and more effective the facility will be able to 
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respond in emergencies. However, anyone who has worked in a LTC facility realizes there 
are many demands on staff time, especially those at the managerial and supervisory level. 
What people would like to do and what they can actually do can be much different, 
especially when it deals with preparing for events that are sometime in the future and not 
as pressing in common day-to-day activities that never seem to end. 
 At a minimum, an Emergency Preparedness Plan should cover the key areas 
required by The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and Kentucky State Statutes. 
In addition, best practices go far beyond minimum compliance and these are included in 
the Kentucky All Hazards LTC Emergency Planning Manual. The study used the following 
items as the most important to track for the quality of facility’s emergency plan, which will 
be called Implementation for purposes of this study. Implementation moves beyond 
Compliance, in this case we call it adoption, and captures best practices as identified at the 
time of the survey including: a facility specific hazard vulnerability analysis, sections that 
covered responsibilities and tasks for a wide range of potential hazards, sheltering-in-place, 
emergency evacuations and a evacuee surge inflow from evacuating health facilities. It is 
generally recommended that an emergency plan should cover these items including what 
tasks should be carried out and by whom and who has authority to make what emergency 
response decisions. At the time of the survey, any item beyond compliance was voluntary 
and marks a facility’s investment of resources in site-specific emergency planning. 
The degree of emergency preparedness training was assessed by tracking the 
number of different trainings and the range of organizations providing the training. It is 
important for a facility’s emergency preparedness leadership to engage in this training 
because it is the portal to knowledge about the innovation. It is often the opportunity to 
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establish relationships with peers and first responders, learn about the best communication 
methods with outside emergency management, and learn about who is responsible for what 
in an emergency. Quality of preparedness is based on the generally accepted assumption 
that the more types of training team members complete (range), the better the facility plan 
and the more prepared a facility will be to deal with serious emergency events.  
Information about the numbers and sponsors of exercises that are completed by a 
facility was also collected. Some exercises are carried out within the facility emergency 
planning team such as the hazard vulnerability analysis.  Others are facilitated and 
sponsored by external preparedness and response partners, where a community group 
simulates an emergency and “walks” through the completeness of their response relative 
to the exercise scenario. Whatever is lacking in the plan is added to the emergency plan. 
Team members also may participate in regional (county, multi-county or state areas) 
exercises. Exercises related to sheltering-in-place, emergency evacuations, or client surge 
inflow usually involve additional staff in a facility. Again, the quality of facility 
preparedness is generally believed to be better the more a facility conducts different type 
of exercises (range) and makes improvements to their plan. 
There are certain factors that are related to the adoption of innovation or new 
practices. Some of these are taken from Rogers (2005). Rogers research found that chief 
administrators with more education and more involvement with regional, state and national 
networks tend to be early adopters and more likely to experiment with new concepts. The 
study tested whether their leadership contributes to greater adoption and implementation. 
More recent research findings that Rogers has conducted with researchers from academic 
management programs also indicates organizations that go through a process of reviewing 
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new information and adapting it to their specific organizations are much more likely to 
adopt and retain new practices. Their work indicates that this organizational review process 
by a group of facility team members is very important to the adoption process. There are a 
few questions about this in the survey instrument specifically about adoption of the KY All 
Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual and the estimated percentage of adoption of 
the manual at the time of the survey. 
Experience with the emergency preparedness and response network indicates that 
any facility that wants to develop an effective response to emergencies must be aware of 
the local emergency managers and how they can assist in different emergencies as well as 
how they can help facilities plan and train for emergencies, particularly those facilities 
vulnerable to significant hazards. This is related to another area covered in the survey. 
Respondents are queried in several places if they have established relationships with 
emergency managers and other sources during emergencies, preparing emergency plans, 
facilitating a wide variety of training as well as on-site, local, regional and statewide 
exercises. This engagement with partners adds to the depth of a plan, effective response 
during an event and enhanced life safety of residents. 
 The survey was based on earlier work done by Eiring, Blake and Howard, (2012) 
and incorporated elements of the KY Hospital Preparedness Program. 
 
Illustration 3.1 lists items in the order they are covered in the survey: 
 
Facility Profile 
 # of residents in each service (licensed bed size) 
 Location and type of community (urban/rural, eastern/western region);  






Years working (overall experience in LTC, position experience & stability in 
same organization, same position) 
Network organizations (local, state, national) 
Network contacts (state, regional, local) 
# Emergency preparedness meetings in 5 years 
 
Facility Emergency Experience 
 Prior experience with evacuation  
 Prior experience with medical surge 
 
Disaster Plan 
 Awareness of KY All Hazards LTC Emergency Preparedness Manual 
  Used any of it/how much it 
 Completed Hazard Vulnerability Analysis 
  Identified types 
  Developed emergency plan to degree of hazard risks  
 Community contacts/procedures covered in plan 
 Have on-site generator (type of fuel & more for emergency fuel) 
 
Training in Emergency Preparedness 
 Emergency Preparedness Team role (job title) 
HPP Regional health care coalition training experiences 
Training needs 
 Type needed, if any 
 
Work with County Emergency Manager/Preparedness Partners 
Completed Mutual Aid agreements and MOU/MOAs with the HPP regional  
  health care coalition, its members, and/or other LTC 
Communication with key groups 
Evacuation sites and transportation resources 
  
Sample selection 
Sample selection reflected the ongoing challenge of ensuring reasonable response 
rates from LTC facilities through both electronic and direct mail communication. Nursing 
facilities in Kentucky at least have been a challenge as a group to respond to direct mail or 
electronic mail.  In the early days of the KY Emergency Preparedness for Aging & LTC 
Program, a LTC administrator offered what turned into good advice, “we do not take calls, 
open mail or e-mail unless we know the person”. As a result, the KY Emergency 
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Preparedness for Aging & LTC program made extensive efforts to establish relationships 
such that, if an e-mail was sent, it received a response in the program’s role as first 
responder for LTC to the KY Department for Public Health.  
The survey sample used a purposive method identifying the LTC facilities likely to 
have had exposure to preparedness planning and be knowledgeable about their facility’s 
plan. Sign-in sheets from previous trainings, meetings or exercises facilitated by 
preparedness partners were used to collect contact information. An e-mail was sent in 
advance to let the recipient know to expect an invitation to participate in the survey. Finally, 
a letter of invitation was sent by e-mail announcing the survey with the link to the Qualtrics 
site to complete the survey.  
Data collection 
Ninety-one nursing facilities out of 284 were sent invitations through e-mail with 
links to the survey on Qualtrics and a separate consent form. Multiple invitees within LTC 
facilities were sent e-mails due to employee turnover rates in LTC facilities. Follow-up 
requests to participate were e-mailed at six weeks, eight weeks and ten weeks after the 
initial request. The invitation requested that the survey be completed by the person with 
the most knowledge in the facility about its emergency plan.  
Consent Procedures  
 The study used a Preamble consent which was included in the link to the 
survey on Qualtrics as a separate form with a forced response of yes or no. All 






Ninety-one long term care facilities were sent the survey questionnaire.  Responses 
were received from 69 facilities (75.82% return rate). Data cleaning involved eliminating 
multiple respondents from the same facility, duplicate responses from the same 
respondent, and incomplete surveys (i.e. where respondents simply completed the facility 
name or their years of experience). Ultimately, the final sample of 50 LTC facilities 
was used for all analyses (54.94% of the 91 facilities that were sent surveys; 72.46% of 
the 69 facilities that returned surveys).   Sample sizes were compared to state data for 
region, geography and bed size with results indicating representativeness to LTC 
facilities across the state.   Type of ownership was not compared due to lack of access 
to state data on this particular variable.   
Data analysis approach 
There was two parts to the analysis. The first part used descriptive analysis to 
assess representativeness of survey responses to all long term care facilities. Long 
term care facilities were collapsed into regions (East/West), urban and rural 
locations, bed size, ownership type and respondent job title and responding facilities 
were grouped in similar manner.   In addition, the descriptive analysis also identified the 
communication methods used by LTC facilities to gain knowledge about diffusion 
innovation.   The second part of the analysis consisted of using inferential statistics to 
identify factors related to the adoption and implementation of emergency management 
practices.   
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Q1:   What is the profile of Long Term Care (LTC) facilities participating in 
emergency preparedness planning?  
Kentucky is primarily a rural state with four Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area 
located in the Louisville-Jefferson County, Lexington, Paducah-Mayfield, and seven 
counties in Northern Kentucky. The geographic representations have been collapsed 
further into Eastern and Western regions with Louisville and Western Kentucky making 
up the Western portion and the Eastern region comprised of  Lexington/Northern/Eastern 
Kentucky making up the East region.  As can be seen in Table 2, sixty-eight percent (n=34) 
of the respondents were from facilities located in the western half of Kentucky and the 
other twenty-eight percent (n=16) were from facilities located in eastern part of Kentucky 
(see map). Fifty percent (n=25) of the facilities were located in urban counties and the other 
fifty percent (n=25) were in rural counties.  Facility bed size ranged from under-50 beds 
(12.0%), 50 to 99 beds (50%), 100 to 149 beds (32%), and over-150 beds (4%).  Sixty-two 
percent (n=31) of the facilities’ bed sizes ranged from 1-99 while only 36% (n=18) of the 
facilities’ bed size was 100 or more beds.  Lastly, the majority of the facilities (62.0%, 
n=31) were for-profit institutions of long term care.  
These categorical comparisons reflect equivalence to KY LTC except for east 
(n=16) versus west (n=34) because of the difference in sample size. The western facilities 
include a sampling bias due to the disproportionate representation by Louisville-based 
facilities (22%); however, this bias provided an equal percentage of urban and rural LTC 
in the sample. 
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Response to research questions
Table 2:  Profile of Sample Characteristics  
 
Facility Characteristics N % 
 
Bed Size 
   
<50 beds 6 12.0% 
 
50-99 beds 25 50.0% 
 
100-149 beds 16 32.0% 
 
150+ beds 2 4.0% 
 
Bed Size Collapsed 
   
1-99 beds 31 62.0% 
 
100+ beds 18 36.0% 
 
KY Region 
   
East 16 32.0% 
 
West 34 68.0% 
 
Geography 
   
Urban 25 50.0% 
 
Rural 25 50.0% 
 
Ownership 
   
For Profit 31 62.0% 
 











Q2:   What is the profile of representatives/leadership of Long Term Care (LTC)  
  facilities participating in emergency prepredness planning? 
 
 Long Term Care (LTC) facility administrators were asked to select the person with 
the greatest knowledge of the facility’s preparedness to complete the survey. In practice, 
the administrator very often appoints another manager to chair the “safety” committee or 
“preparedness” committee. Typically, those appointed are managers who attended 
trainings and HPP regional  health care coalition meetings and/or LTC subcommittee 
meetings represented all areas of responsibility within the facility. The managers 
participating and completing the survey were administrators/ assistant administrators ( 
44%, n =22), director of nursing (10%, n=5), facility manager (14%, n=7) and other (30%, 
n= 15) which included assistant director of nursing (2.0%), corporate representative 
(2.0%), executive assistant ( 2.0%), human resources (4.0%), risk management (2.0%) and 
social services (2.0%).  
 Facility managers had been in their current position on average the longest 
(mean=9.09 years, SD = 6.07) and the Director of Nursing the fewest number of years 
(mean =5.25, SD = 2.82); although not surprisingly, administrators/assistant administrators 
had been working in the long term care industry on average more than twice the amount of 
time (years) of other categories of managers participating in emergency preparedness 
planning.  It bears exploration to examine differences between facility manager and 
administrator scores for implementation. Administrators have ultimate responsibility for 
compliance items as there are monetary sanctions attached while voluntary elements can 
be naturally championed by other managers. 
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% Mean SD= 
     
Administrator/Assistant Administrator 22 44.0%   
Years in LTC * 
  
25.14 9.29 
Years in the LTCF** 
  
12.34 9.57 
Years in Current Position 
  
8.21 8.10 
Director of Nursing 5 10.0%   
Years in LTC 
  
10.08      5.80 
Years in the LTCF 
  
6.58 4.67 
Years in Current Position 
  
5.25 2.82 
Facilities Manager 7 14.0%   
Years in LTC 
  
11.95    6.50 
Years in the LTCF 
  
10.09 5.71 
Years in Current Position 
  
9.09 6.07 
Other 15 30.0%   
Years in LTC 
  
12.66 10.00 
Years in the LTCF 
  
7.72 4.35 
Years in Current Position 
  
5.51 2.96 
     
 
* LTC = Long Term Care 





Q3: What are the current elements in LTC facilities’ emergency preparedness 
 plans?  
In 2014, there were very few specific emergency preparedness-related federal or 
state regulations.  The emergency events that were addressed by federal and state regulation 
pertained to fire, power outage, and sheltering-in-place needs for a minimum of 2-3 days 
(KY).   Specifically, required elements for LTC facilities in 2014 included: a written fire 
response plan incorporating quarterly fire drills; sprinkler systems; emergency doors and 
lighting. The “mandated” emergency plan had few details and required the facilities have 
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a back-up generator capable of powering emergency lighting in hallways and the “red” 
outlets in each room. These outlets carry electric current in emergency situations for items 
such as oxygen, ventilators, etc.  Additionally, an evacuation plan to an alternate care site 
was required and plans that addressed response during power outages and water 
emergencies. 
 Kentucky regulations are greater than many other states and fewer than the coastal, 
hurricane-vulnerable states.  Kentucky’s requirements include: staffing plans in the event 
of an emergency, identification of individual resident needs during an emergency, a system 
to contact staff in the event of an emergency requiring additional staff, surplus emergency 
supplies for at least 2-3 days, back-up power with fuel for  a minimum number of days, 
medications sufficient to meet the resident needs, and records of all training attended by 
staff to be kept up-to-date and on the premises.   The following table displays the current 
elements reported by respondents representing long term care facilities across the state of 




Table 4.   Current Elements in LTC Facilities’ Emergency Preparedness Plan 
  
 N % 
Does your facility have a comprehensive emergency preparedness plan? 46 92.0% 
   
Does your facility have an evacuation plan to an alternate care site? 37 74.0% 
   
Does your facility have a communication plan in place for disasters?         46 92.0% 
   
Transportation contracts in the event of an evacuation 28 56.0% 
   
Have a system to communicate with staff during an emergency 46 92.0% 
   
Have a central place to capture characteristics and needs of residents 34 68.0% 
   
Water for 2-3 days 46 92.0% 
   
Food 2-3 days 47 94.0% 
   
Does your facility have an on-site emergency generator?      47 94.0% 
   
Generator covers air conditioning 28 56.0% 
   
Generator covers heat 33 66.0% 
   
Generator covers emergency lighting 47 94.0% 
   
Generator covers critical care of residents 42 84.0% 
   
Generator fuel supply 2-3+ days 31 62.0% 
   
Contract with fuel vendor  36 72.0% 
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Nearly all of the respondents (92%) reported that their facility had a comprehensive 
emergency preparedness plan, including having food (94%) and water (94%) for 2-3 days, 
an onsite emergency generator (94%) which covers emergency lighting (94%).   These 
items are among the required elements for preparedness and resident care by both federal 
and state regulations.  Fewer respondents (56%) reported voluntary measures such as 
existing transportation contracts in the event of an evacuation or generator supported air 
conditioning (56%) as part of their emergency preparedness plans and contracts with fuel 
vendors (72%). The hurricane experience in Florida in the summer of 2018 pointed out the 
critical nature of these items as residents died as a result of no air conditioning and/or 
inadequate transportation planning. 
 
Q4:  Are LTC facilities aware of a) recommended best practices and guidelines? 
 and b) how did they become aware? 
 
At the time of the survey, there were only minimal requirements to be included in 
an emergency plan. Minimum best practices include those items in current CMS Life 
Safety and Preparedness regulations. Little is spelled out with specificity for what defines 
preparedness within these regulations. The arbitrary nature of the regulations leave LTC to 
fill in the blanks on their own.  
In order to develop a comprehensive emergency plan, LTC had to find state and 
corporate plans or attend training provided by the state associations. The KY All Hazards 
LTC Emergency Planning  and Resource Manual  incorporated guidance and practices 
from over twenty state plans, county plans and individual facility plans from across the 
country. This manual was designated as the “best practice” for long term care preparedness 
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by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) of the 
Department for Health and Human Services (DHHS).   
In addition, the Office of Inspector General of the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid funded a study following the hurricanes Katrina and Rita (2007) that identified 
gaps in preparedness planning for and implementation of preparedness and response plans. 
A follow-up study (2010) was also funded and found fewer facilities followed their plans 
or had effective plans than the 2007 study. CMS issued “recommended guidelines” for 
preparedness planning in 2007 after the initial report and revised them in 2010. These 
guidelines were voluntary and added items to best practices that had never been considered.  
The KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual covered three major 
preparedness categories and responses represented facility use of each category: 1) hazard 
vulnerability and response templates based on each of 17 hazards (60.0%), 2) facility 
operations (60.0%) and, 3) employee personal readiness (52.0%). Additionally, the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services issued Recommended Guidelines for Emergency 
Preparedness. The guidelines represented an expanded list of practices for emergency 
preparedness. CMS issued a set of voluntary guidelines to mitigate the impact of severe 
hazards to life safety as organized in five over-arching topics.  
Awareness of the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual was 
positively reported by forty-two of fifty respondents (84.0%), and the primary method of 
education about the manual was through training provided by the KY Emergency 
Preparedness for Aging & LTC Program (54%) followed by the state LTC associations 
(28%), the HPP regional health care coalitions (22%) and the  KY OIG (8%). Surprisingly, 
respondents did not become aware of the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource 
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Manual from peers (8%) rather from change agents. This is a departure from Rogers’ 
definition of diffusion which views communication among peers as the most powerful 
means of spreading an innovation. Awareness of the CMS recommended guidelines was 
reported by 96% (N=48) of respondents but there was not a specific survey question to be 
able to cite the source of their knowledge. The recommendations were included in the KY 
All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual accompanied by a crosswalk for staff to 
find the planning tools for each recommended item. 
Q5:  Are LTC facilities a) utilizing any of the recommended best practices and b) 
guidelines for  their emergency preparedness plan and, c) what  specific potential 
emergencies and disasters are addressed?   
 
Best practices included in the  KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual 
and the CMS recommended guidelines were captured by the survey. In response to the 
survey question as to whether facilities adopted any or all of the KY All Hazards LTC 
Planning and Resource Manual, 70.0% (n=35) of respondents reported some degree of 
adoption. The survey question related to the percent of adoption of the manual found 24.0% 
had no adoption of the manual with 62.0% reported varying degrees of adoption.  
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Table 5a :  Best Practices Facility has in Place: 
   
 N % 
   
A comprehensive emergency preparedness plan  46 92.0% 
   
An evacuation plan to an alternate care site  37 74.0% 
   
A communication plan in place for disasters         46 92.0% 
   
Transportation contracts in the event of an evacuation 28 56.0% 
   
A system to communicate with staff during an emergency  46 92.0% 
   
A central place to capture characteristics and needs of residents 34 68.0% 
   
Emergency water supply for 2-3 days  46 92.0% 
   
Emergency food supply for 2-3 days  47 94.0% 
   
An on-site emergency generator      47 94.0% 
   
A generator that covers air conditioning 28 56.0% 
   
A generator that covers heat 33 66.0% 
   
A generator that covers emergency lighting  47 94.0% 
   
A generator that covers critical care of residents  42 84.0% 
   
Emergency generator fuel supply 2-3+ days  31 62.0% 
   
Contract with emergency fuel vendor 36 72.0% 
 
Use of the CMS guidelines are represented in Table  5b below. Awareness of 
facility personnel contact, emergency manager contact and facility organization structure 
are high, from 84% -92%. In other words, facility organizational knowledge is high; 
however, the care of residents and safety of the building are substantially lower at 66% - 
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68%, respectively. This becomes especially problematic in a disaster or an emergency and 










In addition, critical best practices for any organization’s emergency preparedness 
is the Hazard Vulnerability Analysis (HVA). The HVA assesses an organization, or in this 
case, nursing homes’ exposure to the most likely hazards so emergency plans can be 
developed based on the most significant risk both on scale of the risk and scope of the 
impact on the residents, staff and the building and critical systems. The HVA, however, is 
not a required element at the time of this study.  
The KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual  includes seventeen types 
of hazards representing the most common hazards for Kentucky with planning templates 
for each hazard. A total of forty out of forty-seven respondents responded in the affirmative 
(85.1%, SD= 3.58) that they had completed an HVA. Survey respondents further identified 
a mean number of eleven hazards out of a possible seventeen hazards their facilities could 
have incorporated into their plans. The top three ranked templates were Resident 
Table 5b:  LTC Adoption of CMS Recommended Guidelines 





Characteristics and Needs of Residents 
 
34 68.0% 
Emergency Manager Contact Information  
 
44 88.0% 
Facility Organization Chart 
 
42 84.0% 




Elopement (97.1%), Tornado (97.1%) and Bomb Threat (91.3%). Two-thirds of 
responding facilities had identified thirteen different hazards to address in their plans. It is 
interesting that the preparedness for a bomb threat (91.3%) is greater than an extended 
power outage (84.1%). The power outage is an event that can occur during normal weather 
conditions or during a true disaster and provide a greater threat to facilities and resident 
safety. There may also be a factor that the LTC with natural gas-fired generators (18.0%) 
may not be impacted during an extended outage since they have a continuous source of 
back-up power.  
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Table 5c. Disasters Addressed by the Facility Preparedness Plan 
 
N  % 
 
Resident Elopement 67    97.1% 
 
Tornado 67  97.1%  
Bomb Threat 63  91.3% 
 
Severe Thunder Storm 62  89.9% 
 
Earthquake 59  85.5% 
 
Extended Power Outage 58  84.1% 
 
Water Shortage 58  84.1% 
 
Winter Storms 57  82.6% 
 
Hazardous Materials 53  76.8% 
 
Ice Storms 52  75.4% 
 
Pandemic Influenza 50  72.5% 
 
Extreme Temperatures 48  69.6% 
 
Flooding 46  66.7% 
 
Hurricane 16  23.2% 
 
Other Disease Outbreak (e.g. SARS) 14  20.3% 
 
Sink Holes 9  13.0% 
 





Q6: Are LTC facilities discussing emergency preparedness planning and 
 coordination with other community organizations?  
 
 The survey asked respondents to select from a list of eighteen 
organizations/community partners with whom they had discussed emergency 
preparedness. This question addresses the active implementation of innovation as users 
have reached out to external sources, partnership activities and collaboration with others in 
their communities. The mean number of outside preparedness partners reported was 6.67 
(SD=4.30), a relatively high number given the time and effort required to become part of 
a local, regional and/or state effort. The range of partners includes the following: 
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Table 6: Discussed Emergency Preparedness with Community Partners 
 N= % 
Fire Department  34 68.0% 
County Emergency Manager 34 68.0% 
Local Hospitals 29 58.0% 
Police 27 54.0% 
Local Health Department 25 50.0% 
Hospital Preparedness Program Regional Health Care        
Coalition 18 36.0% 
KY Emergency Preparedness for Aging & LTC Program 18 36.0% 
KY Emergency Management 16 32.0% 
KY Department for Public Health 14 28.0% 
County Emergency Operations Center 14 28.0% 
Utility Company 14 28.0% 
KY LTC Ombudsman Program 12 24.0% 
Office of Inspector General 11 22.0% 
American Red Cross 11 22.0% 
State LTC Association 11 22.0% 
State Emergency Operations Center 6 12.0% 
Hospice Organizations 6 12.0% 
National LTC Association 3 6.0% 
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Responses to this question reflect the preference to partner with local first responders and 
hospitals followed by regional partners and, lastly, state level responders. 
 
Q7:  How prepared operationally are LTC facilities to manage an emergency or  
 disaster?  
 
 Operational preparedness addresses the infrastructure of the facility, basic 
operations to manage facility critical operations for resident care and, as the hurricanes  
have made apparent this fall, the ability to sustain the safety of the building, residents and 
staff. Continuity of Operations Planning (COOP) is another best practice from the CMS 
recommended guidelines. It covers the procedures necessary for LTC to operate in an 
emergency situation, whether they are sheltering in the facility, an alternate care site due 
to evacuation or are severely short-staffed due to pandemic outbreak. Elements of a COOP 
plan include staffing plans in an emergency, financial systems, IT and record-keeping, 
electronic health records, medications, sufficient supplies of food, water, medications, the 
delivery of needed services for residents onsite or off-site, power and shelter-in-place with 
enough supplies to be self-sufficient for a minimum of 2-3 days.  
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Table 7:  Facility Operations      
 N  %  
Back-up Generator Fuel Type*      
Diesel 28  56.0%  
Propane 7  14.0%  
Natural Gas 9  18.0%  
Other 3  6.0%  
     
Current # Hours of Fuel in a Power Outage     
24 – 47* 4  8.0%  
48-71 5  10.0%  
72 - 96 12  24.0%  
120 - 250 7  14.0%  
Unlimited 7  14.0%  
      
Additional Fuel Contracts      
Have contract 36  72.0%  
Supplier outside of 50 miles 6  12.0%  
      
Days able to shelter-in-place during a power outage     
Two – Three* 23  46.0%  
Four – Six 5  10.0%  
Seven – Ten 14  28.0%  
More than Ten 4  8.0%  
      
Functions Relying on Generator Power      
Resident critical care functions (such as oxygen)* 42  84.0%  
Emergency lighting* 47  94.0%  
Heat 33  66.0%  
Laundry facilities 13  26.0%  
Air Conditioning 28  56.0%  
Refrigeration 38  76.0%  
Cooking Elements 28  56.0%  
Elevators 15  30.0%  
Monitoring/Security systems (e.g., WanderGuard®) 35  70.0%  
Other 3  6.0%  
     
Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)                                      23  46.0%  
     
     
The data followed by an asterisk reflect the compliance with regulatory standards. Yet, in 
an emergency, the lack of voluntary planning suggests heightened risk for KY should a 
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true no-notice disaster occur. The facility operational items listed are critical for sheltering-
in-place particularly in a protracted catastrophic or near-catastrophic disaster situation such 
as a tornado or earthquake. Over 80% of respondent facilities exceeded the minimum 
number of days of back-up fuel and 54% can shelter in place during a power outage in 
excess of the 2-3 day minimum. Thirty-six percent (36%) indicated they could shelter-in-
place for an extended period of time. The analysis of what facility functions are hooked up 
to the generator included heat and air conditioning. These functions have the biggest impact 
on maintaining resident quality of care and put residents at risk for dehydration and other 
life-threatening conditions. The hurricane Irma experience in Florida is a glaring example 
of the risks to life and litigation against a LTC facility caused by loss of heat and air 
conditioning. One LTC facility in western Kentucky had a similar experience in 2009 with 
the ice storm when no assistance was available from responders to provide assistance with 
a back-up generator and two residents died from the physical stress from loss of heat. 
 
Q8: How prepared are LTC facilities to manage a) an evacuation of residents 
 from their facility in case of an emergency or disaster and b) to host evacuees 
 from another institution/health care facility?   
 
The elements in preparedness for evacuation involve a number of steps in the 
development of an effective plan. The first step is to have policies and procedures in place 
for decision-making as to when to call for an evacuation compared to sheltering-in-place. 
Once resident life and safety are at risk or the infrastructure is damaged to the point that 
critical facility functions cannot be maintained, identification of who has authority to make 
the most difficult call any administrator can make takes place. Once that is decided, the 
next step is to call on the locations identified as alternate care sites, using established 
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Mutual Aid agreements and/or MOA/MOUs. As available beds are sought, the next step is 
to contact the county emergency manager and transportation providers under contract for 
evacuations. It is very helpful to have at least one transportation vendor located beyond 
fifty (50) miles in the event all transportation providers in the immediate vicinity are 
already committed to other facilities. Hurricane Katrina taught providers that the scale of 
the disaster may be so great, the availability of resources may require areas beyond the 
impact areas (Hyer, K., Polvika-West, L. & Brown, L. 2008). 
An evacuation readiness index was developed to capture the facility readiness for 
evacuation. The following items were included in the index: 
 Arrangements to evacuate to alternate care sites (ACS) 
 Presence of Mutual Aid Agreements and/or MOA/MOUs 
 Developed a previous connection with the County Emergency Manager 
about preparedness prior to a surge situation 
 Presence of transportation agreements with providers during an evacuation 
 Presence of a transportation agreement beyond 50 miles 
 A composite evacuation readiness index score was calculated by summing all 
identified indicators of evacuation (1=yes, 0=no) resulting in possible index scores ranging 
from 0-14.  Actual scores ranged from 0 to 14 with the mean score of 6.6 and   
 (SD=3.09) and 7.00 median score.   T-tests were run against the independent variables and 
no significant differences were found. While no significant differences were found, one 
can observe the difference in scores between urban and rural respondents with the rural 
communities have fewer options for transportation and convenient transfer of residents to 
other LTC facilities and evacuation planning may be the difference between life and death. 
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Be that as it may, scores for all categories indicate the need for better planning, and 
additional training and exercises.  
 
 
Table 8:  Comparison of Evacuation Readiness Index Scores  by 
Selected Independent Variables    
   
 
    
 N % Mean SD= t= df p= 
 
    
   
Bed Size        
Small-Medium 31 62.0% 6.87 3.442 .518 46 .607 
Large 18 36.0% 6.39 2.52    
 
       
Ownership        
For-profit 31 62.0% 6.48 2.669 -.510 47 .612 
Non-profit/Governmental 19 38.0% 6.95 3.749    
        
Region        
East 16 32.0% 6.63 2.335 -.054 47 .957 
West 34 68.0% 6.68 3.426    
        
Geography        
Urban 25 50.0% 6.08 2.999 -.1.336 47 .188 
Rural 25 50.0% 7.24 3.139    
        
Job Title (Collapsed)        
Senior Management 27 54.0% 6.33 2.760 -.790 47 .433 
Other Management 22 44.0% 7.05 3.552    
        
  
LTC may be called upon to receive evacuated residents from a damaged facility or 
a hospital in a major disaster in a so called “medical surge”. Plans that facilitate effective 
surge in the midst of an emergency is the presence of Mutual Aid agreements and 
MOA/MOUs, pre-arrangements related to reimbursement for services provided to 
evacuating residents at the receiving site and a process to identify available beds and report 
them to the sending facility.   Over half of the facilities (54%, n=27) had a surge plan to 
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host evacuees from another healthcare facility, but only a few facilities had ever hosted 
evacuees from other LTC experiencing an emergency (12%, n=6) or had  reimbursement 
plans in place if faced with a medical surge (16%, n=8).  This is important because 
reimbursement to the receiving facility is based on the funding source of the bed in the 
sending facility. Therefore, if a private pay facility receives and cares for a Medicaid bed 
resident, the receiving site will only be reimbursed at the Medicaid rate. A similar situation 
exists between a Medicaid bed and a Medicare-paid bed with reimbursement higher for the 
Medicare bed resident. 
    
Q9: What experience do LTC facilities have with emergency preparedness 
 training and drills/exercises?   
  
 Over the years, Kentucky LTC have had access to a wide range of training from 
state emergency management, local emergency managers, HPP regional health care 
coalitions, the KY Emergency Preparedness for Aging & LTC Program, state LTC 
associations, national conferences and others. These same groups also sponsored local, 
regional and statewide emergency exercises testing communication planning, evacuation 
plans, surge plans among other types of exercises. These efforts by the sponsors and the 
LTC facilities that participated in them established networks of responders and LTC and 
preparedness partners leading to more effective skills and improved emergency plans. The 
following chart represents the sponsors of trainings and the same list for organizations 
sponsoring exercises. The mean number of trainings attended by respondents was  3.49 




Table 9:  LTC Experience with Training and Exercises 
       # Trainings       # Exercises      
    
Types of Sponsors     Training Sponsors  Exercise Sponsors 
 N        %  N   % 
Corporate Office 1 2.7%    4 10.8% 
      
County Emergency Management 11 29.7%  17 45.9% 
      
County Emergency Operations Center 7 18.9%  12 32.4% 
      
Emergency Medical Services 0 0.0%    9 24.3% 
      
Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) 8 21.6%    8 21.6% 
      
Fire Department 7 18.9%    1   2.7% 
      
KY Emergency Management (KYEM) 17 45.9%  22 54.5% 
      
KY Dept. for Homeland Security 2 5.4%    6 16.2% 
      
KY Dept. for Public Health 6 16.2%    1   2.7% 
      
KY Emergency Preparedness for 
Aging & LTC Program 18 48.6%    7 18.9% 
      
Local Health Department 8 21.6%    3   8.1% 
      
Police Department 4 10.8%    6 16.2% 
      
Red Cross 4 10.8%  12 32.4% 
      
HPP Regional Health Care Coalition  19 51.4%    6 16.2% 
      
State Emergency Operations Center 5 13.5%  13 35.1% 
      
State LTC Association 10 27.0%    7 18.9% 
      
Other 2 5.4%  11 29.7% 
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The analysis found that the training sponsors are not necessarily the sponsors of 
emergency exercises. There is a clear preference of training sponsors from the HPP 
regional health care coalitions (51.4%) followed by the KYEPA (48.6%) and KY Division 
of Emergency Management (45.9%). Responses to exercise opportunities were led by the 
KY Division of Emergency Management (54.5%), County Emergency Management 
(45.9%), KY Emergency Operations Center (35.1%), County Emergency Operations 
Centers (32.4%) and the Red Cross (32.4%). The results related to exercises are somewhat 
puzzling given the exposure to training that respondents received from HPP health care 
regional coalitions yet LTC has not participated much with regional exercises. It may 
suggest that the HPP regional health care coalition trainings LTC attended were KYEPA 
trainings facilitated as part of the HPP regional health care coalition meetings. In actuality, 
KYEPA provided the trainings and supported HPP regional health care coalition exercises. 
Perhaps HPP regional health care coalition exercises have not integrated LTC content 
sufficiently to warrant their time and effort. Anecdotal evidence suggests that HPP regional 
health care coalitions over-focus on hospital exercise requirements and do not fully support 
LTC participation. 
 
Q10:  Are there any regional/geographic, facility size differences in regards to 
 emergency preparedness plans? (i.e. elements of plan, specific potential 
 emergencies and disasters addressed,  awareness and utilization  of 
 recommended best practices and guidelines, engaging  community 
 organizations, facility operations, evacuations, and experiences with training, 
 drills/exercises). 
 
 T-tests were performed to explore whether there are significant differences between 
elements of emergency plans to the independent variables. Plan elements utilized in the 
analysis included a)  three overarching operational elements of the plan found in the KY 
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All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual, b) the number of HVA templates 
incorporated in their plans, c) the number of CMS recommended guidelines adopted, d) 
number of community preparedness partners, e) number of types of training attended by 
respondent, f) number of exercises and exercise sponsors, g) number of transportation 
contracts, h)number of evacuation sites, and i) the number of outside preparedness 
meetings attended in the past two years.  
 Significant differences were found between job titles categorized as senior 
management and “other” management and the number of HVA templates, number of 
community partners and number of exercise sponsors with “other” management scores 
higher than senior management respondents. A significant difference was found between 
the eastern and western regions on the number of CMS guideline categories. Differences 
in ownership type were significant for the number of meetings attended with non-
profit/governmental strikingly greater than for-profit. Geographic differences between 
urban and rural locations were the most consistently significant for the number of CMS 
guidelines adopted, number of community partners, and the different numbers of exercise 
sponsors.  Rural locations reported higher use of HVA templates, more partners, 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Q. 11:  Are there any regional/geographic, facility size differences in regard to 
emergency preparedness plans in regards to a) Adoption and b) Implementation of 
the plan as defined by Rogers’ Diffusion Innovation Theory?   
 
Adoption Scale 
A composite adoption index scale was calculated by summing all identified 
indicators of compliance (1=yes, 0=no) resulting in possible index scores ranging from 0-
15.   Actual scores produced a mean score of 13.38 (SD=3.907), a fairly high score given 
that there were respondents with little adoption of compliance elements. The median score 
was 14.0 suggesting that half of responding organizations reported meeting adoption 
(compliance) requirements of preparedness. In this analysis, there were significant 
differences between east and western region mean scores. The difference in sample size 
could be a contributor as there are more early adopters in the east sample and that is where 
the initial adoption from LTC was the greatest. 
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Table 11a:  Adoption Scale:        
Means Comparison between Adoption Scale and Independent Variables     
   
 
SD= 
   
 N % Mean t= df p= 
 
    
   
Bed Size        
Small-Medium 31 63.3% 13.33 3.876 -.245 46 .807 
Large 18 36.7% 13.61 4.132    
     
   
Ownership        
For-profit 31 62.0%      13.81 3.978 .986 47 .329 
Non-profit/Governmental 19 38.0%      12.68 3.788    
        
Region        
East 16 32.0% 14.94 2.909 1.992 47 .052 
West 34 68.0% 12.65 4.133    
 
       
Geography        
Urban 25 50.0% 12.84 4.478 -.977 47 .333 
Rural 25 50.0% 13.92 3.239    
        
Job Title (Collapsed)        
Senior Management 27 55.1% 13.37 3.607 -.034 46 .973 
Other Management 22 44.9% 13.41 4.415    
        
Implementation Index Scale 
 Implementation in the Rogers’ model occurs when the user, in this case a LTC facility, 
takes the innovation, emergency preparedness, and makes it their own by altering a model 
to fit the uses of the adopter. Implementation is a step beyond adoption whereby actual 
operationalization of the model is specific to the user, for instance taking voluntary 
measures beyond compliance.   A composite implementation index  scale was developed 
by incorporating actual elements that are named, identified and specific to steps towards 
preparedness.   The implementation index incorporates the selection of steps based on the 
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CMS guidelines and best practices exclusive of those required (compliance) as well as 
critical elements based on best practices from the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and 
Resource Manual.  The Implementation scale incorporates preparedness elements 
including:  
 Facility awareness of the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual ,  
 Percentage range of adoption of the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource 
Manual,  
 A Continuity of Operations Plan has been completed,  
 At least one of three CMS recommended guidelines have been adopted, 
 Facility can identify more than one transportation vendor contract, 
 Facility has at least one memorandum of understanding or memorandum of 
agreement with another location for assistance during an emergency, primarily for 
receiving evacuees, 
 The facility can name at least one community preparedness partner,  
 The facility has trained staff certified in at least one level of the NIMS Incident 
Command System (ICS),  
 At least one of three operating sections of the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and 
Resource Manual that have been adopted,  
 Facility has completed its Hazard Vulnerability Analysis (HVA),  
 Facility has adopted at least one of the emergency response templates for staff 
response during an emergency, 
 The back-up generator is connected to building security in the event of a power 
failure,  
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 The back-up generator is connected to the elevators in the event of a power failure, 
 The back-up generator is connected to kitchen appliances in the event of a power 
failure,       
 The back-up generator is connected to the refrigeration units in the event of a power 
failure,  
 The back-up generator is connected to the heating and air-conditioning equipment 
in the event of a power failure,  
 Certified in NIMS Incident Command System, 
 The back-up generator is connected to the laundry in the event of a power failure,  
 The communication plan includes talking to resident families during an emergency,  
 A facility representative has attended at least one outside preparedness planning 
meeting, such as the HPP regional health care coalition meetings during the past 
two years, 
 The facility has made arrangements with at least two healthcare or non-healthcare 
related locations for sending evacuees,  
 Facility has at least one transportation contract for evacuation purposes, 
 And, at least one of the transportation vendors is beyond 50 miles,  
 Facility participated in at least one outside emergency exercise or drill with a 
community partner, 
 During the past five years, the number of exercises or drills the facility has 
participated in is at least one,  
 The facility has a medical surge plan in-place. 
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 A composite implementation score was calculated by summing all 
identified indicators of implementation (1=yes, 0=no) resulting in possible index scores 
ranging from 0-26.  Actual scores ranged from 1 to 26 with the mean score of 19.06 
(SD=5.505) and median score at 21.0 suggesting that half of responding organizations 
have implemented nearly all of preparedness best practices.  
Table 11b:  Implementation Scale:        
Means Comparison between Implementation Scale and Independent Variables 
  
   
  
   
 N % Mean SD= t= df p= 
Bed Size        
Small-Medium 31 62.0% 18.19 5.02 1.219 46 .229 
Large 18 36.0% 16.33 5.38    
        
Ownership        
For-profit 31 62.0% 17.00 5.17 -0.769 47 .446 
Non-profit/Governmental 19 38.0% 18.16 5.17    
        
Region        
East 16 32.0% 19.13 3.54 1.614 47 .113 
West 34 68.0% 16.65 5.62    
        
Geography        
Urban 25 50.0% 15.76 5.61 -2.419 47 .019 
Rural 25 50.0% 19.12 4.10    
        
Job Title (Collapsed)        
Senior Management 27 54.0% 17.22 4.83 -0.275 46 .785 
Other Management 22 44.0% 17.64 5.72    
        
 
Scores on the implementation scale as viewed through the multi-variate analysis found 
degrees of voluntary preparedness from 60-74% implementation with the main differences 
found between the rural mean of  19.12,  (SD=4.10) and the mean from urban facilities of  
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15.76, (SD=5.61). This indicates a difference between adoption (compliance) and 
voluntary implementation.  
Q. 12:  What is the overall readiness of KY LTC for a no-notice emergency event? 
 Readiness for a no-notice disaster would involve all of the best practices for LTC 
preparedness. The Adoption scale produced a mean score of 13.38 (SD=3.907) with a 
median score of  14.0 on a 1-15 scale. Actual scores for the Implementation scale ranged 
from 1 to 26 with the mean score of 19.06 (SD=5.505) and the median score at 21.0 
suggesting that half of responding organizations have implemented  nearly all of 
preparedness best practices, a score that was greater than expected.  The implementation 
scores find that LTC that had attended training and voluntarily integrated best practices in 
their planning are not only prepared to put the CMS Final Rule for Emergency 
Preparedness in place. Overall readiness to respond to a no-notice emergency event, 
however, necessitates very strong evacuation planning. The mean score for the evacuation 
index was only 6.6 (SD=3.09) on 1 to 14 scale with a 7.00 median score with no significant 
differences on the multi-variate analysis. This finding suggests that plans may have 
integrated best practices but the greatest gap, i.e. evacuation planning, is the most critical 
in a no-notice situation. LTC require more training and exercising their evacuation plans 







   
A purposive sample of ninety-one long term care facilities in Kentucky out of 284 
were invited to participate in a survey about their emergency preparedness planning as of 
July, 2014. Surveys from fifty (50) long term care facilities were received and analyzed. 
The research questions explored facility preparedness, professional affiliations, the 
number and scope of emergency preparedness and response partners, training received 
and the extent of comprehensive planning respondents had in place. 
The importance of this study is significant as this research provides an historic 
perspective and baseline data for KYs LTC Emergency Preparedness initiatives from 
which to continue to research. It documents the importance of relationship building, 
personal contact and communication among all players in community resilience and 
contributes to the gap in studies on no-notice events. It provides a new application of the 
DOI theory to emergency preparedness and suggests the importance of change agents. 
Overall, the results from this study suggest that the sample of LTC facilities that 
completed the survey are very prepared for emergencies arising from no-notice events.  
Specifically:  
 The inroads made by the KYEPA and its partners are significant in raising 
the awareness of the best practices in the KY All Hazards LTC Planning and 
Resource Manual  Surprisingly, respondents did not become aware of the 
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 KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource Manual from peers (8%) 
rather from change agents. This is a departure from Rogers’ definition of 
diffusion which views communication among peers as the most powerful 
means of spreading an innovation. 
 Nearly all of the respondents reported that their facility had a 
comprehensive emergency preparedness plan, including required elements. 
Fewer respondents reported voluntary measures as part of  their emergency 
preparedness plan. 
 70.0% of respondents reported some degree of engaging in adoption.  
 Hazard Vulnerability Analyses were completed by 85% of facilities. They 
reported including an average of 11 out of 17 different listed hazards in their 
HVA. 
 Active implementation of innovation is reflected by respondents’ 
connections to external sources, partnership activities and collaboration 
with others in their communities. The mean number of outside preparedness 
partners reported was 6.67 is a relatively high number given the time and 
effort required to become part of a local, regional and/or state effort.  
 Operational readiness was high as is the ability to shelter-in-place during a 
power outage of 2-10 days. There is a significant gap for respondent 
facilities in their Continuity of Operations Planning however placing them 
at risk in a catastrophic event and a pandemic situation. 
 Scores for all categories on the evacuation index indicate the need for better 
planning, and additional training and exercises. There is also a gap in 
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preparedness to host evacuees from other facilities. Better planning is 
needed a surge of beds and reimbursement agreements if payment sources 
vary with concomitant reimbursement rates.  
 Over the years, Kentucky LTC have had access to a wide range of training 
and emergency exercises. The analysis found that the training sponsors are 
not necessarily the sponsors of emergency exercises. Perhaps HPP regional 
health care coalition exercises have not integrated LTC content sufficiently 
to warrant their time and effort. Anecdotal evidence suggests that regional 
health care coalitions over-focus on hospital exercise requirements and do 
not fully support LTC participation. 
 Geographic differences between urban and rural locations were the most 
consistently significant for the number of CMS guidelines adopted (rural), 
number of community partners (rural), and the different numbers of 
exercise sponsors (rural).  Rural locations also reported higher use of HVA 
templates, more partners, use of guidelines, and more exercise sponsors but 
not to a significant degree. 
 Differences between other manager and administrator scores for 
implementation may be a worthwhile focus in a follow-up study with a 
larger sample. The “work” of preparedness planning appears to be delegated 
to facility managers and other categories.  Significant differences were 
found between job titles categorized as senior management and “other” 
management on the number of HVA templates, number of community 
partners and number of exercise sponsors with “other” management scores 
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higher than senior management respondents. In addition, other managers 
who attend training, participate in exercises and network with preparedness 
partners scored higher on implementation measures. These are the managers 
who provide operational leadership during an emergency. They report they 
have the responsibility yet not the power to make important decisions about 
preparedness planning priorities. 
 There was relatively high adoption (compliance) with regulations in-place 
at the time of the survey followed by higher implementation scores than 
anticipated. Correlations of participation in training and exercises found 
adoption (compliance) is not correlated with training or exercises. However, 
implementation is greater as the number of trainings and exercises both 
increase.  
 Rural LTC in the sample reported greater investment in comprehensive 
preparedness planning; on the other hand, the urban locations appear either 
late to the awareness of the need to prepare or expect the perceived 
plentitude of resources to be available when in need. 
 Overall readiness in emergency preparedness implementation is high in this 
sample. Readiness to respond to a no-notice emergency event is high but 
the greatest gap is in evacuation planning, the most critical response 
challenge in a no-notice situation. LTC require more training for exercises 
of their evacuation plans to be reasonably prepared. 
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 Trainings offered by the KYEPA either free-standing or as part of events 
sponsored by the two state long term care associations are the preferred 
method of gaining new knowledge about preparedness. 
  Survey data indicated the preference of LTC facilities to attend training that 
reflect their specific issues and concerns. The difference in participation 
rates between change agent offerings and more general HPP regional health 
care coalition training and exercises suggests the need to offer both types 
for preparedness implementation to continue longer term. These 
partnerships have proven to be a powerful dissemination approach which 
led to adoption and implementation. These partnerships should be 
continued. 
Limitations of the Study 
 This study is not without its limitations.  The study used a purposive sampling 
approach to identify facilities with at least minimum exposure to emergency preparedness.   
Thus, sample selection was only able to target one-third of KY LTC facilities versus the 
entire population of facilities.  The resulting final sample of fifty facilities limited the scope 
and level of the data analysis.   Future studies should include all KY LTC in their adoption 
and implementation now that the CMS Final Rule has been enacted.  Due to the concrete 
nature of emergency preparedness, a large number of activities were identified and 
measured, but no standardized measures were used.   Finally, the study did not start out to 
explicitly test, apply, or operationalize Rogers theory of diffusion of innovation theory or 
its concepts.  The relevance of Rogers’ theory was only retrospectively applied in the 
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course of the data analysis and discussion of the results.   Therefore, the findings related to 
adoption and implementation should be viewed in that context.                     
Practice Implications 
 The findings of this study suggest that local, state and federal expectations of LTC 
facility preparedness and capacity to respond in no-notice emergencies are unrealistic. 
While LTC facilities prepare to become compliant with the scope of the CMS Final Rule, 
supporting agencies such as CMS, ASPR and FEMA as well as state departments for public 
health and emergency management do not consider the industry as part of critical 
infrastructure as they do hospitals. As such, they still look to LTC facilities to be self-
sufficient. Self-sufficiency is less realistic than resilience.  There will never be enough 
transportation assets to respond to a true community disaster.   Everyone will be on their 
own until federal resources arrive, which usually would take 3-5 days. Therefore, the 
importance of resilience in the capacity to shelter-in-place for LTC facilities is the number 
one priority in terms of operational resources and staffing, communication resources and 
planning, and sufficient supplies of water, food, medications, and fuel for back-up 
generators. Emergency managers now talk about having on reserve a 7-10 day instead of 
the 3-day supply of critical resources as currently required by regulations.   Storage of that 
amount of supplies is a challenge for many if not most facilities. However, good planning 
with vendors beyond the 50-mile range and relationships with county emergency managers 
may offset some of the risk of storing less than optimum supplies. 
This is not to lessen the need for better evacuation planning or more frequent 
evacuation exercises for facilities.   Since this is the biggest challenge, it deserves the most 
consistent practice through exercises. With staff turnover a challenge for all LTC facilities, 
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at least annual evacuation exercises should occur for all staff on all shifts. The CMS Final 
Rule and its emphasis on Memoranda of Understanding provides impetus for LTC facilities 
to establish as many agreements with potential receiving sites as feasible. In Kentucky, this 
would necessitate a statewide reach since there may not be sufficient beds to respond in a 
true disaster. 
Future Research 
There continues to be a great need for more research on no-notice disaster events, 
especially outside of the research on hospital mass fatality response. Funds are scarce for 
researching emergency preparedness in non-hospital settings such as LTC facilities. What 
research is available is from study of anticipated events, such as hurricanes. Therefore, 
building on the current study, follow-up studies of emergency preparedness are warranted 
especially of no-notice emergency states, especially now with the advent of comprehensive 
new federal regulations. 
 The questions around diffusion suggest that further research on the role of change 
agents in the diffusion process may be worthwhile. The study highlights the significant 
impact of change agents on adoption and implementation with LTC as a target population. 
In view of the importance and scope of the new regulations, LTC needs as many trusted 
resources as possible that can use their language and assuage their concerns to meet the 
CMS timetable. Diffusion of Innovation is a very appropriate theory to utilize in adoption 
of new regulations regardless of the field. It can also be useful with groups or organizations 
serving vulnerable populations to prepare them for an   emergency where there is a gap in 
regulation or no regulation, e.g. HUD-funded  housing for older persons. 
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Federal efforts remain too militaristic in their language and approach. And, health 
care coalitions remain over-focused on hospitals needs without considering how to 
effectively engage LTC and keep them engaged. Continued research on these efforts is 
another worthwhile area for exploration as ASPR shifts their emphasis to self-sufficient 
coalitions. The greater questions revolve around the effectiveness and sufficiency of the 
CMS Final Rule regulations not only as written but in practice during disasters. 
Conclusion 
 Kentucky LTC facilities have identified a process of knowledge gathering and 
partnerships that contribute to enhanced emergency preparedness. It appears that the lower 
access to community resources has produced greater preparedness or resilience in no-notice 
emergency events. The facilities will require even more intense access to training and 
emergency exercises as they implement the CMS Final Rule regulations. If those resources 
become available, Kentucky long term care facilities are likely to utilize them and thus 
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Kentucky Emergency Preparedness for Long Term Care 
 
Purpose: The purpose of this survey is to understand the current status of Kentucky Long 
Term Care in emergency preparedness planning.  This survey intends to assess current 
Kentucky Long Term Care readiness to respond to any and all emergencies.   
 
Directions:  We request that the person/s most knowledgeable about the facility 
emergency preparedness planning  complete the survey to the best of your ability 
based on your facility’s current emergency plan. 
 
Facility Name: ___________________________________________________________   
County: ___________________ 
 
1. Current job title  
 Administrator 
 Assistant Administrator 
 Director of Nursing 
 Facilities Manager 




EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLAN 
 
2. Does your facility have a comprehensive emergency preparedness plan? 
 Yes   No    Don’t know 
 
3. During the last two (2) years, have you made changes to your facility emergency 
preparedness plan? 
 Yes   No    Don’t know 
 
4. Has your facility completed a Hazard Vulnerability Analysis? 
 Yes   No    Don’t know 
  
5. Does your facility emergency preparedness plan address different types of disasters 
based on your Hazard Vulnerability Analysis?  (check all that apply):  
 
 Bioterrorist Event (e.g. anthrax)    Resident Elopement 
 Bomb Threat       Severe Thunder Storm 
 Earthquake       Sink Holes 
 Extended Power Outage     Tornado 
 Extreme Temperatures      Water Shortage 
 Flooding       Wildfire 
 Hazardous Materials      Winter Storms 





 Facility Fire       Ice Storms 
 Pandemic Influenza      Other (Please Specify):  
        ____________________ 
     
 
6. Are you aware of the UK/U of L  KY All Hazards LTC Planning and Resource 
Manual? 
 Yes   No    Don’t know 
 
 
If yes, from whom did you first hear about the manual? (Check all that apply)  
 UK/UofL LTC Training     County Emergency  
         Manager 
 State Long Term Care Association    KY LTC Ombudsman  
         Program 
 Regional Hospital Preparedness Coalition   KY Office of Inspector  
         General 
 Local Health Department     KY Dept. for Public  
         Health   
 A peer in the field or facility (Please Specify their role:     
  _______________________ 
 Other (Please Specify): 
_____________________________________________________  
 
7.  Has your facility adopted any or all of the UK/UofL  KY All Hazards LTC 
Emergency Planning Manual? 
   Yes       No   Don’t know 
 
 If yes, what percentage (%) of your facility emergency preparedness plan would 
you estimate has been adopted from the KY All Hazards LTC Resource and Planning 
Manual? 
 
 0%              1-20%  21-40%  41-60%  61-80%  81-
100% 
 
If yes, does your plan include any of the following? (Check all that apply)  
 Emergency Response Disaster Templates /Job Tasks  
 Employee Personal Readiness  
 Facility Operations  
 
8.  Has your facility adopted the CMS recommended guidelines found in the KY All 
Hazards LTC Resource and Planning   Manual, to include? (Check all that apply) 
  Facility personnel names and contact information   
  Characteristics and needs of residents, e.g., acuity   
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  Contact information of local and state emergency managers   
   A facility organization chart   
   Building construction and Life Safety systems information 
 
9.   Has your facility established an All Hazards Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)? 
   Yes  No   Don’t know 
 
10. Has your facility been certified in any or all of the NIMS ICS modules?  (Check all 
that apply) 




11.  Have you discussed emergency preparedness planning and coordination with any of 
the following agencies/officials?   (Check all that apply)  
 County Emergency Management   Local Hospitals 
KY Emergency Management   State Professional or advocacy 
 organization (e.g., state  
County Emergency Operations Center         
KY Emergency Operations Center  National Professional or advocacy  
       organization     
Local Health Department (e.g., American Health Care 
Association; Leading Age )       
KY Dept. for Public Health               UK/UofL Emergency Preparedness &  
       Aging Program 
Hospital Preparedness Program Coalition  Other Universities or Academic Medical  
       Centers 
Local Energy Provider    Red Cross 
Fire Department     KY Office of Inspector General   
       Surveyor 
Police Department     KY LTC Ombudsman Program 
Hospice Facilities     Don’t know 
None of the above       Other (Please Specify):    
      ____________________ 
 
During the last two (2) years, what is the approximate number of state, regional and/or 
local meetings attended by a representative of your facility per year, related to emergency 
preparedness planning?  __________ 
 
12.  Does your facility have a communication plan in place for emergencies? 
 Yes  No  Don’t  know 
 
13. Do you discuss emergency preparedness plans with your residents’ families?  
Yes   No  Don’t know 
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If yes, please share what types of communications, (e.g. initial admission, 




14.  Do you discuss personal and family emergency preparedness planning with your 
staff? 
Yes   No  Don’t know 
 
If yes, please share what types of communications, (e.g. new employee 
orientation, staff training,  newsletters,   
etc.)____________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. What is your primary mode of communication with your staff during an emergency? 
 Ham Radios     Land phone lines    Mobile  
          phones 
 Satellite phones    Walkie-talkies    Smart  
       Phone (e.g., Blackberry) 
 Other (Please Specify): 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. What is your primary mode of communication with outside authorities during a 
disaster? 
 Ham Radios     Land phone lines    Mobile  
          phones 
 Satellite phones    Walkie-talkies    Smart  
   Phone (e.g., Blackberry) 
 Other (Please Specify): 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. What is your primary mode of communication with residents’ families during a 
disaster? 
 Ham Radios     Land phone lines    Mobile  
          phones 
 Satellite phones    Walkie-talkies    Smart  
       Phone (e.g., iPhone) 




18. If your facility has had an evacuation in the last two (2) years, did you have any 
contact with your county Emergency Manager?  




19. If your facility has had an evacuation in the last 2 years, did you have any contact 
with the KY. Dept. for Public Health?  




20.  Does your facility have an on-site emergency generator?  
Yes   No  Don’t know 
 
If yes, what type of fuel does it require? 
 Diesel Natural Gas          Propane Other 
________________________ 
 
 Which of your facility’s functions rely on generator power in the event of a power 
outage? 
        (Check all that apply) 
Resident critical care functions (such as oxygen)  Heat 
Laundry facilities     Air Conditioning 
Emergency lighting    Refrigeration 
Cooking Elements     Elevators 
Monitoring/Security systems (e.g., WanderGuard®)  
Other (Please Specify): ________________________ 
 
 How long (in hours) are you able to maintain power supply without receiving 
additional fuel from outside sources? 
________________________________________________________ 
 
 Do you have a contract to receive additional fuel for your generator during an 
 emergency? 
Yes   No  Don’t know 
 
If you have contracts to receive additional fuel, are any of the suppliers 
outside of a 50 mile radius? 
   Yes   No  Don’t know 
 
21. How many days is your facility able to shelter-in-place when there is a power outage?  
One   Two – Three  Four – Six    
Seven – Ten More than Ten  Don’t know 
 
22. How many days supply of non-perishable food does your facility have stored in case 
of a power outage?  
One   Two – Three  Four – Six    
Seven – Ten More than Ten  Don’t know 
 
23. How many days supply of emergency drinking water does your facility have if you 
lose water?  
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One   Two – Three  Four – Six    
Seven – Ten More than Ten  Don’t know 
 
24.How is your emergency water supply maintained on site? (Check all that apply)  
Bottled water (individual size)  Not stored on site 
Bottled water (gallon/gallon+)  Contract with vendor to provide water  
      during an emergency 
Chemically treated (e.g. bleach, First Water System)   
Separate water tank, carbon filtered Separate water tank, non-carbon filtered 
None of the above    Other (Please Specify): ____________ 
Don’t know 
 
25. Does your facility use electronic medical records? 
Yes   No  Still working on it 
 
If yes, are you able to access your electronic medical records off site? 





26.  Does your facility have a plan for resident evacuation to another healthcare facility? 
 Yes  No        Don’t know             Within 50 miles          Outside 
50 miles 
 
If there is another healthcare facility where your residents will be transferred in 
case of an evacuation, what type of facility is it? (Check all that apply) 
 
 LTC (Sister Facility)    Hospital    
 LTC (Non-Sister Facility)           Independent Living Facility 
 Assisted Living Facility    Hospice Facility    
 Other (Please Specify): _____________________________________ 
 
What type of agreements do you have in place with other healthcare facilities 
where your residents may be transferred in case of an evacuation?  (Check all that 
apply)  
 
 Contract    Memorandum of Understanding      Mutual Aid Agreement 
  
 None of the Above  Don’t Know      Other (Please Specify): 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
         Do you have reimbursement arrangements in place with these facilities for the 
 hosting of your residents?  
 Yes     No     Don’t know 
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27.  Do you have arrangements in place to transfer your residents to non-healthcare 
facilities in 
 case of an evacuation?    
 
 Yes     No     Don’t know 
 
If yes, what type of non-healthcare facilities do you have arrangements to 
transfer your residents to in case of an evacuation?  
 Church     School 
 Community Recreation Center  Red Cross Shelter 
 Other (Please Specify): _________________________________ 
 
28.  Do you have contracts with transportation providers in the event of an evacuation?  
 Yes   No    Don’t know 
 
If yes, what type(s) of providers? (Check all that apply)  
 Ambulance Service     Non-Emergency Transport  
      Vehicle 
 Bus Company – local schools    Wheelchair Accessible  
         Vehicle 
 Bus Company – commercial     Other facility-owned  
         vehicles 
 Churches       Community agencies 
 Vendors beyond 50 miles: __________________ 












29.  Does your facility have a surge plan to host evacuees from another healthcare 
facility, such as LTC or a hospital? 
 Yes   No    Don’t know 
 
30.  Has your facility ever hosted evacuees from other LTC experiencing an emergency? 
  Yes   No    Don’t know 
 




31.  In the past two (2) years, how many times has your facility participated in disaster 
 drills/exercises (other than fire drills)?  
 None        One   Two      Three   Four 
  More than four 
 
If yes, what agency/group managed the exercise? (Check all that apply)  
 
 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)  State Emergency   
         Operations 
      Center 
 Kentucky Emergency Management Agency   County Emergency  
         Operations 
      Center 
 County Emergency Management     Fire Department 
 UK/U of L LTC Training      Police Department 
 KY State LTC Association      Corporate Office 
 Regional Hospital Preparedness Coalition (HPP)   Red Cross  
 Local Health Department      Other (Please Specify):  
 KY Dept. for Public Health                                      ___________________________ 
           
   
32.  Have you personally participated in any disaster planning/emergency training other 
than at 
 your facility?  
 Yes    No     Don’t know 
 
If yes, who provided the training? (Check all that apply)  
 
 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)  KY LTC state  
          association 
 Kentucky Emergency Management Agency   County Emergency 
     Operations Center 
 County Emergency Management    Fire Department 
 UK/U of L LTC Training     Police Department 
 Nursing Home Association      Corporate Office 
 Regional Hospital Preparedness Coalition   Red Cross  
 Local Health Department     KY Office of  
         Inspector General 
 KY Dept. for Public Health     
 Other (Please Specify):  
        
 __________________________________________________________ 
 
33.   List any additional training you or your facility would like to have available related 
to long term care emergency preparedness:  __________________________________ 
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Please share any additional information you would like with the researchers to improve 






This survey was based on the work of David Hammond, P.hD,  Hilary Eiring, Ph.D and 
Sarah Blake, Ph.D; Department of Health Policy & Management, Rollins School of 
Public Health, Emory University. We appreciate their generosity in allowing us the 
opportunity to adapt their material. 
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